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ABSTRACT
STEPHEN KYLE TADLOCK: Spears for Hire: The Utilization and Motivations of
Greek Mercenaries in the Archaic and Classical Ages
(Under the direction of Aileen Ajootian)
Greek mercenaries were widespread in the Mediterranean in the Archaic and Classical
periods. This thesis examines the mercenaries themselves and the kingdoms that
employed them in order to discover both why mercenaries turned to the service and why
rulers hired them. The focus is primarily on Greek hoplites serving in the kingdoms of
Persia and Egypt, although other mercenaries and other employers are also considered.
Most of the sources used in this study were Greek literary works in translation, although
some use was made of archaeological, epigraphical and rhetorical evidence. The ancient
sources used were chosen based upon previous readings or the usage of secondary
sources to locate relevant portions of texts. The research demonstrated that mercenaries
played an important part in the military and domestic affairs of the countries that hired
them, especially Egypt. Mercenaries were hired to fulfill crucial roles that native troops
could not, and also because they carried with them certain inherent advantages. Greek
mercenaries showed great diversity in background, but the average mercenary seems to
have been a middle-class male, twenty to thirty years of age, who provided his own
armor and who had been previously active militarily in his home state. Men were
motivated to take up service by a number of factors. Some of these motivations were
based on decisions of the mercenaries themselves, and others stemmed from events
beyond their control. Many mercenaries went East because there were both greater needs
and greater rewards for them there.
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Introduction

Greek mercenaries were an important part of life in the Classical age, especially
in the fourth century B.C, when there was a dramatic surge in the number ofthem who
were employed in the Mediterranean basin and in the East. It has been calculated that
during the years between 399 and 375 B.C, there were on average some 25,000 Greek
soldiers for hire under employment, and the average for the remainder of the century may
very well have been double that number.’ These figures make Greek mercenaries a mass
phenomenon that both contemporaries and later historians have struggled to understand.
Mercenary service did not begin in the fourth century, however, or even in the
Classical age. Long before Cyrus led the Ten Thousand against the king of Persia, the
Egyptian pharaohs of the seventh century had employed equal if not larger numbers of
mercenaries in their own campaigns. The object ofthis thesis is to examine Greek
mercenary service in the Archaic and Classical ages (c. 660-323 B.C.) with a view to
answering two distinct but related questions. The first question is why mercenary service
was so prevalent in the time in question. Both the historical context in which mercenaries
were employed and the specific needs of the employers which these soldiers might have
fulfilled will be examined in order to answer this question. The second question is what
motivated Greek men to take up mercenary service in the first place. This examination
will focus on both the men themselves and on their possible motivations.

Parke 1933, p. 227.
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The Archaic and Classical ages were chosen for this study because they
encompass both the known beginning of Greek mercenary activity in the ancient world
and also the time of its greatest proliferation. The study thus opens with the first known
mass hiring of mercenaries sometime in the 660s-650s B.C. and closes with the defeat of
Darius III, the last Persian king, in 331 B.C., at Gaugamala. These dates were chosen
because they represent the beginning and the end of mercenary employment by the two
great empires of the East, Egypt and Persia, not the end of mercenary employment
entirely. Greek mercenaries continued to be used by Alexander the Great's successors
until the rise of the Roman Empire ended their activities.
The study was narrowed down further by the desire to focus primarily upon the
utilization of Greek mercenary heavy infantry, or hoplites. Hoplite armor and tactics
were a largely Greek innovation and served to set the Greeks apart in terms of the way
the fought. Because of their uniqueness, hoplites were the chief mercenary export of
Greece during the time in question. When the Greeks themselves employed mercenaries,
they usually brought in lighter-armed peltasts to counter the hoplites of enemy Greek
states.^
The Persian Empire and the kingdom of Egypt were chosen for study because
both possess a long and relatively well-documented history of employing Greek hoplite
mercenaries. In the fourth century, however, they were not the only ones hiring. The
Greek tyrants of Sicilian Syracuse also utilized large numbers of mercenaries both to
enforce their rule at home and to prosecute their war with Carthage. The period of
employment by the Sicilian tyrants was relatively short lived, however, whereas the

“ Hiring of peltasts: Trundle 2004, p. 40. Both types of soldier will be explained in greater detail in Chapter
3.
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Eastern principalities provide a wider field of study. The Sicilian tyrants will not be
completely ignored, however, because they do provide important clues on significant
issues relating to the utilization of mercenaries as a whole. Nor will the Greek city-states
be neglected, for they too provide important information on the general circumstances of
mercenary employment, since they occasionally hired mercenary hoplites as well.
The following chapters are ordered in such a way as to follow a linear progression
of thought that answers the two questions while avoiding needless repetition of key
events and ideas. Some repetition is necessary, however, given the relative lack of
sources for some incidents and the fact that the two questions are closely related in many
respects. Thus the work proper opens with preliminary matters relating to the sources
and definitions of some of the key terms used throughout. The second chapter will look
at mercenaries in the context of Eastern history and their role in it, thus setting the
historical stage for the analyses that follow. Many of the incidents in this chapter will be
analyzed subsequent ones. Chapter three will examine the mercenary as a soldier and
compare him with the native troops and tactics of his employers in order to determine
what benefits he brought to the latter. General advantages and disadvantages will also be
examined. In the following two chapters, four and five, we shall turn to examine the
mercenaries themselves in order to determine who they were and what their possible
motivations were. The final chapter will answer the question of why mercenaries went
East.
The alert reader will notice that there is a dearth in book-length studies of Greek
mercenaries from after the 1930s, when Parke and Griffith published their influential
studies, until the past decade, when the issue was revisited by Bettali and Trundle in book
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form and many others in shorter works.^ The author has found no ready explanation for
the lack of secondary sources published during this time. Perhaps it is that the reputation
and thoroughness of these early studies have for the most part discouraged further work
until lately when new theories have been offered. No matter what the cause, these two
works remain a vital part of any study of Greek mercenaries. Parke in particular will be
used throughout this thesis because although some of his conclusions have been recently
contested, his remains the seminal work on Greek mercenaries for the period in question.

^ These works are Parke 1933, Griffith 1935, Bettalli 1995, and Trundle 2004.
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I
Sources, Definitions, and Problems of Interpretation

Before a proper study of“Greek mercenaries” and their place in the ancient world
can began, both of these terms must first be defined. Defining ‘"Greekness” can be
difficult, especially given that Greeks seem to have thought of themselves as members of
their own city states rather than as a unified whole. After the Persian Wars, however, a
new idea of what it meant to be Greek emerged from the contact with the oriental
kingdom.' It was after these wars that the “barbarians"’ began to invade Greek literature,
especially the Attic plays.^ Hellenic identity was created by placing Greek common
ideals in contrast with those of outsiders.^ Culture also played a part in defining Greeks,
especially in the areas of language and customs.^ Thus those who did not speak Greek or
observe Greek customs, such as the hard-drinking Macedonians and the aggressive
Carians were not considered to be Greek, whereas those colonists on the Ionian coast of
Asia Minor were.'"'
The definition of a mercenary is likewise difficult to establish. The modem
definitions of a mercenary cannot precisely be applied to the ancient world because of the
nature of ancient politics. It can, however, be useful as a starting point from which to
arrive at a more fitting definition. The following modem definition is taken from the
Protocols to the Geneva Convention:

'Hall 2002, p. 175.
- Hall 2002, pp. 175-179.
Hall 2002, p. 179.
“Hall 2002, p. 189.
^ The Carians were a non-Greek speaking people of Asia Minor famous in early antiquity for producing
mercenaries. They interacted and intermarried with the Greeks of Ionia and often fought alongside them as
mercenary hoplites. Because of this latter fact, they will be considered alongside the Greeks in this work.
See Homblower (1982, pp. 4-34) for a brief summary of Carian history up to 391 B.C.
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2. A mercenary is any person who:
(a) is specially recruited locally or abroad in order to fight in an armed
conflict;
(b) does, in fact, take a direct part in the hostilities;
(c) is motivated to take part in the hostilities essentially by the desire for
private gain and, in fact, is promised, by or on behalf of a Party to the
conflict, material compensation substantially in excess of that promised or
paid to combatants of similar ranks and functions in the armed forces of
that Party;
(d)is neither a national of a Party to the conflict nor a resident of territory
controlled by a Party to the conflict;
(e) is not a member of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict; and
(f) has not been sent by a State which is not a Party to the conflict on
official duty as a member of its armed forces.^
As stated above, there are certain problems with the preceding definition as it
applies to ancient Greek mercenaries. While point(a) is of course relevant and indeed
critical to the definition of a mercenary, part(b)is in some ways problematic. Ancient
mercenaries did not always necessarily fight, and indeed it was especially common in the
Persian Empire for Greek mercenaries to serve as garrison troops and as bodyguards to
satraps.^ Such a posting would not necessarily involve combat or even the prospect of
combat, since cities would require garrisons even in times of relative peace. Part(c) fits

^ Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of
Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June 1977, article 47, section 2. See the
introduction of Trundle 2004 for a similar approach to the definition of mercenary.
^ Trundle 2004, p. 56.
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the ancient model of mercenary service in that Greek mercenaries were motivated by
personal gain and that such gain was promised by the employers. As will be shown
below, however, such remuneration was not typically greater than received by a citizensoldier.8 Part(d) is also essential to the definition of mercenary service because Greek
mercenaries were not considered as such if fighting for their own states. Subsection (e) is
true in the sense that Greek mercenaries usually fought in separate units, and, in the
Greek literature at least, were considered separately from the native forces of their
employer. The final section is a tricky one in that it requires the sorting out of the exact
relationships between states from which mercenaries came and the states which
employed them. Thus it is perhaps best to leave out this particular section for the
definition of an ancient mercenary.
Thus it seems that a Greek mercenary could be considered as a Greek who was
specifically recruited to serve in the capacity of a soldier by a foreign power with the
promise of personal gain. Such a definition encapsulates the majority of Greek
mercenaries, even those whose circumstances might be considered unusual. In Egypt, for
instance, some Greek mercenaries settled down and intermarried into the local populace,
but were still considered to be a separate people by the native Egyptians. It would also
allow for those mercenaries who were sent on state-sponsored mercenary activities.
In addition to the difficulties present in trying to define the ancient Greek
mercenary there is also the problem of determining which soldiers in ancient literature
are serving as mercenaries. The main difficulty is that there was no single Greek word
meaning “mercenary.” This confusion in nomenclature means that in order to determine
if the soldier or army in question is a personal or political ally, citizen-soldier, or hired
“ See Chapter 4.
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spear, one must take into account the political and social context of the situation.^ The
issue is further complicated by the fact that Greek words known to have been used to
refer to mercenaries change throughout the Archaic and Classical Ages.
In the fifth-century B.C. texts, for instance, mercenaries are usually referred to as
10

epikouroi (sing, epikourous).

This term simply means “helper” and is regarded by

some historians as euphemism on the part of the ancient authors to avoid mentioning the
fact that money was involved in the transaction, since both the giving and taking of
II

wages was in the period considered to be a social stigma,

Unfortunately for the

historian, epikouroi could also be a force sent from an allied state or a private force not
12

representing another state {ethelontai) fighting out of friendship rather than profit.
Making the determination of motives even more difficult is the fact that even a loyal ally
13

might expect some remuneration for its efforts,

Thus, defining whether or not an

individual or military force was truly mercenary in the fifth century requires a good deal
of interpretation.
Also used during this time was the word ^^xenos^ which had several meanings.
14

among them “foreigner” and “guest-friend,

This term is as difficult to interpret as the

previous one, since mercenaries typically were foreigners (at the very least in the sense of
being from a different city), and might also have had the ritual friendship the word
15

implies with those for whom they were fighting.

By the same token, these xenoi might

also have been ethelontai drawn by personal fiiendship, or even allies. Xenophon uses
^ van Wees 2004, pp. 71-72.
10
Parke 1933, p. 20; Trundle 2004, p. 10.
Parke 1933, pp. 20-21.
12
van Wees 2004, p. 71.
van
Wees 2004, pp. 71-72.
14
Trundle 2004, p. 10.
15
van Wees 2004, p. 71. This topic will be further developed in Chapter 4.
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16

this term to the exclusion of all others to describe the Cyreans, for example.

In this

context, there is no doubt that xenoi refers to mercenaries, since it is doubtful that all of
17

the ten thousand plus soldiers under Cyrus had a guest-friend relationship with him.
Xenos continued to be employed in the description of mercenaries into the fourth century.
18

and the term has even been found in the writings of the Roman historian Arrian.
The final term, and the one most frequently used in antiquity, was misthrophoros
(pi. misthrophoroi). The word literally means "‘wage-earner” and could be applied to
anyone who was paid regularly. The common usage of this word in the fifth century and
beyond was in part encouraged by the increasing payment of wages in all areas of life.
Everyone from jurors to citizen-soldiers was encompassed by the word. Thus, there was
no longer any shame in taking money, and the euphemistic qualities of the previous terms
were no longer needed. Further encouraging the use of the word was the rapid spread of
mercenary service in the early fourth century, making it a fact of life that could no longer
19

be ignored.

Now that definitions have been given and the problems of interpretation have
been acknowledged and discussed, it is time to turn our attention to the sources that will
be used. There is not as much information on Greek mercenaries as historians would like
to have. Part of this dearth may be the fact that mercenaries were not always looked upon
with favor, and some ancient writers and commentators seem to have chosen to ignore
their existence as much as possible. Whatever the cause, the scarcity of sources makes a
careful evaluation of what information is available of the utmost importance. Most of the

16

Trundle 2004, p. 11.
See
Chapter 4 for more information on this issue.
18
Trundle
2004, pp. 14-15.
19
Trundle 2004, pp. 10-11, 15-16.
17
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evidence for this paper is literary, although some use will be made of epigraphical.
archaeological, and rhetorical evidence.
The earliest author that will be utilized is Herodotus of Halicarnassus, the fifthcentury historian and a rather enigmatic figure. Much of what is known about his life
comes from later classical writers and is questionable in that it fits his life into a pattern
consistent with later and better known historians."® The traditional date of Herodotus’
birth is usually considered to be 484 B.C., and although it is questionable, it does fall into
the acceptable range of possibility. His death is generally reckoned to have occurred in
21

the 420s B.C.“

The Histories of Herodotus are as interesting as they are informative. It is not
known precisely when this work was written, but it was known in Athens by at least 425
22

B.C., when the opening chapter was parodied by the playwright Aristophanes.
Herodotus’ reasons for writing the book were twofold, as he himself reveals in the
opening sentences:

that human achievements may not become forgotten in time [...]
,23

and especially to show why the two peoples [Greeks and Persians] fought each other.’
Despite its seemingly narrow goal. The Histories cover a wide range of topics that
Herodotus saw as contributing to the main theme.
Herodotus apparently traveled extensively, mostly, it seems, between the years
24

454-443 B.C.

During his travels, he asked questions and listened to stories from the

peoples he visited. It is from these oral exchanges that he drew most of the information

20

Hdt. ix, trans. A de Selincourt, London, 2003; IVWCtV, p. 182 s.v. Herodotus(S. Homblower and T.
Spawforth).
WWCJV, p. 182 s.v. Herodotus(S. Homblower and T. Spawforth).
22
0CD\ pp. 696-698 s.v. Herodotus(E.S. Staveley and A. W. Lintott). The parody occurs in Ar. Ach.
488-494, which mocks the cause given by Herodotus for the Persian Wars.
2.^
Hdt. 1.0 (Herodotus’ own introduction to his work).
24
Grant 1994, p. 35.
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that went into his work, although he also used on occasion literary sources and
25

contemporary documents." In writing his work, Herodotus chose not to determine the
veracity of the information he was given but instead presented all of it to his reader and
left to him the task of determining what was true and what was false.

In addition to

history, Herodotus also showed an interest in geography, ethnology, and anthropology,
and it is these additional interests that make his work so informative."^ Despite the
amount and depth of information that he provided, there are problems with Herodotus’
work. One of these problems is that the oral accounts he used, especially those passed
down for decades and possibly even centuries, could have been corrupted at any time, or
28

may have been false from their beginnings,

Another problem is that he often inserted

his own contemporary morals and values into his work. For example, Herodotus
believed in the importance of great men (such as Cyrus the Great) in history, the
interference of the gods in history, the importance of moral character, and the clear
„29

delineation between Greek and “barbarian.

The next source is Isocrates, an important Classical Athenian orator who lived
30

from 486 to 338 B.C.

Unlike most of the orators of his day, Isocrates did not typically
31

speak to large audiences but instead prepared written speeches,

Many of these speeches

have survived, providing an important glimpse into Athenian public life in the late
Classical age. These speeches often mentioned mercenaries, who were frequently
regarded as an important social problem in Greece during his time. Isocrates’ words.

25

0CD\ pp. 696-698 s.v. Herodotus(E.S. Staveley and A. W. Lintott); Grant 1970, p. 62.
Hdt. xxi-xxii, 2.123, 7.152.
27
Grant 1994, p. 62.
28
Hdt. xxxi-xxii, trans. A de Selincourt, London, 2003.
29
Grant 1994, pp. 38-36.
.■<0
OCD^, p. 769 s.v. Isocrates (E.S. Staveley and A. W. Lintott).
0CD\ p. 769 s.v. Isocrates (E.S. Staveley and A. W. Lintott).
26
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however, must be carefully considered in their proper context, since, as an orator, his
purpose in speaking and writing was to convince the audience to endorse a certain course
an action. Despite this problem, his statements provide a contemporary commentary by a
leading intellect.
The next author was a man of many trades and a follower of Socrates. Xenophon
was a soldier, philosopher, and historian who was bom into a wealthy Athenian family c.
32

430 B.C.

After being involved in political stmggles at home, he left to join the
33

mercenary anny being assembled by the Persian satrap Cyrus the Younger in 401 B.C.
He stayed with this army (commonly referred to as the “Ten Thousand” or the
Cyreans”) until their return to the Black Sea. During this seaward trek, Xenophon
emerged as a leader after most of the original generals were murdered by the Persians
34

following the battle of Cunaxa.

In 399 B.C., the same year the Cyreans reached the sea.
35

Xenophon became a mercenary for Sparta.

He fought against Athens at the Battle of

Coronea in 394 B.C. and was exiled from the city as a consequence, but he was
36

reconciled to it before his death in the 350s B.C.

The exact dates when most of his

works were written remain unknown, although it seems most likely that he would have
written them in the years after his mercenary employments had ended.
Xenophon’s output as a writer was significant. The two works that are of most
37

interest to this investigation, however, are the Anabasis and the Hellenica.

Both of

these works are histories, one general and the other very specific. The Anabasis has
32

0CD\ pp. 1628-1630 s.v. Xenophon (E. S. Staveley and A. W. Lintott).
This expedition will be discussed in greater detail in the next chapter.
34
Xenophon as leader: Xen. An. 3.1, esp. 3.1.26. Death of other generals: Xen. An. 2.6.1.
35
0CD\
pp. 1628-1630 s.v. Xenophon (E. S. Staveley and A. W. Lintott).
36
Grant
1994,
p 125; 0CD\ pp. 1628-1630 s.v. Xenophon (E. S. Staveley and A. W. Lintott).
37
The word anabasis'' literally means “march into the interior,” which, as a reading of the text will reveal,
is somewhat of a misnomer. The book is sometimes called The Persian Expedition or The March
Vpcountty. The Hellenica is also known by the English titles Greek History' or A History ofMy Times.
33
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proven difficult to date, although it is now thought that Xenophon wrote it latter in his
38

The Anabasis is the story of the mercenaries hired by the Persian satrap

writing career.

Cyrus the Younger to overthrow his brother, the Persian king. The fact that Xenophon
was a participant in the events he describes both hinders and enhances its value to the
historian. His presence makes him a reliable witness and his expertise on military affairs
39

cannot be denied.'

The problem with this work is that there is a tone of defensiveness

and self-justification that runs throughout. It has been suggested that Xenophon wrote his
account in response to more critical narratives by others who had also participated in the
40

expedition, which would explain the tone,

Regardless of this flaw, the Anabasis

provides the best contemporary look into the lives of mercenaries in the Classical period.
The Hellenica is an attempt to pick up where the fifth-century historian
Thucydides left off with his history of the Greek world. It is believed to have been
41

written shortly before Xenophon’s death in the in the 350s.

The fact that it is the sole

surviving formal contemporary history of the fourth century B.C. alone makes it
42

important to the historian.

There are defects, however. Xenophon does not hide his

pro-Spartan bias and the work has been said to resemble a political tract in some
43

respects.

Also, there are important omissions in the narrative, and much criticism of all
44

the Greek states.

Despite all of these problems, the Hellenica remains an important
45

source for the otherwise unrecorded period of history which it covers,

Its primary use

in this paper is that it records the utilization of mercenary armies not mentioned
38

Xen. An. pp. 8-9, trans. C.L. Brownson, Cambridge, Mass., 1998.
Grant 1994, pp. 126, 131.
40
Grant 1994, p. 127.
41
0CD\ pp. 1628-1630 s.v. Xenophon (E. S. Staveley and A. W. Lintott).
42
Xen. Hell. p. 7, trans. R. Warner, 1978.
43
Xen. Hell. p. 16, trans. R. Warner, 1978.
44
Xen. Hell. p. 16, trans. R. Warner, 1978.
45
Xen. Hell. p. 16,.; 0CD\ pp. 1628-1630, s.v. Xenophon (E. S. Staveley and A. W. Lintott).
39

13

elsewhere and also provides a clear overview ofthe political situation in Greece and the
East.
Demosthenes was one of the most famous orators of Athens. Bom in 384 B.C.,
he rose to prominence in the city despite humble beginnings and a serious speech
46

He did not often speak extemporaneously, although when he did, he

impediment.

47

performed well.

He gave many speeches, and occasionally mentioned mercenaries.

although not as often as did Iscorates. Demosthenes was a man of strong opinions, and
so his speeches are often biased, as will be seen when they are discussed. Like Isocrates
before him, however, his statements provide the historian with a contemporary view of
48

mercenaries and their effects on society.
Diodorus Siculus was a historian of the first century B.C. who lived in the city of
Agyrium in Sicily. Not much is known about his life, except he lived until at least 21
49

B.C. and most likely wrote between the years of60 and 30 B.C.

He wrote in Greek,

and his only work is the Bibliotheca Historica (“library of history”), a forty-volume
universal history that chronicles, in an annalistic fashion, the time from the mythological
50

past to 60 B.C.

51

Ofthose books, only fifteen books survive today.

The Bibliotheca Historica suffers from the problems inherent in all universal
histories. Diodoms Siculus drew most of his material from other, previous sources.
Most of these sources have been lost to the modem historian except for the names,
meaning that it is difficult to know what he might have misrepresented. Furthermore,
46

Plut. Dem. 4, 11.
Plut. Dem. 8-9.
48
OCD^, pp. 456-457 s.v. Demosthenes (E. S. Staveley and A. W. Lintott).
49
. Adkins and Adkins 1994, p. 220;
50
Adkins and Adkins 1994, p. 220; OCD^ pp. 472-473, s.v. Diodorus Siculus(E. S. Staveley and A. W.
Lintott).
51
Adkins and Adkins 1994, p. 220;0CD\ pp. 472-473, s.v. Diodorus Siculus(E. S. Staveley and A. W.
Lintott).
47
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certain themes have been identified that may have compromised his historical accuracy.
These themes include character evaluations, an insistence on personal and collective
52

morality, and the power of patron to provide a civilizing influence.

Finally, Diodorus

Siculus' mental abilities have often been belittled, and some historians have claimed that
53

he both copied his sources and lacked originality.

Despite these shortcomings, the

Bibliotheca Historica remains an essential text for certain decades of history, particularly
54

362-302 B.C.

Arrian (Lucius Flavius Arrianus) was a Greek historian who was bom c. AD 86 in
55

Nicomedia and died sometime between A.D. 160 and 175.

He was a public official in
56

He

both Rome and Athens, and even held the consulate in Rome, perhaps in A.D. 129.

was friends with the Emperor Hadrian and the latter made him governor of Cappadocia in
57

A.D. 131, a post he held until 137.

58

He was a highly regarded writer in his own age.

The work that concerns the present study is his Anabasis ofAlexander, which
follows the Persian campaign of Alexander the Great. The main sources he used for the
59

book are the accounts of two members of the expedition, Ptolemy and Aristobulus.
Unfortunately, Arrian was more concerned with displaying his style than he was with
ensuring factual accuracy, and many points in his history can be contradicted by more
reliable sources.60 Furthermore, the work was intended to be favorable to Alexander and

OCD^, pp. 472-473, s.v. Diodorus Siculus(E. S. Staveley and A. W. Lintott).
Adkins and Adkins 1994, p. 220.
54
OCD^ pp. 472-473, s.v. Diodorus Siculus (E. S. Staveley and A. W. Lintott); Diod. Sic. introduction,
trans. C.H. Oldfather, 1989.
55
The dates of his death vary within the above range. Adkins and Adkins 1994, p. 216;
56
WWCW,pp. 57-58 s.v. Arrian (S. Homblower and T. Spawforth).
57
IVJ4'"CIV, pp. 57-58 s.v. Arrian (S. Homblower and T. Spawforth).
58
fVWClV, pp. 57-5S s.v. Arrian (S. Homblower and T. Spawforth).
59
PViVClV, pp. 57-58 s.v. Arrian (S. Homblower and T. Spawforth).
60
WWCW., pp. 57-58 s.v. Arrian (S. Homblower and T. Spawforth
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a praise of his abilities, rather than a dispassionate discourse on history.

Despite these

flaws, it remains one of the most important sources on the life and campaigns of
Alexander the Great.
The final main source is the Greek biographer Plutarch of Chaeronea (in Boeotia).
His exact dates are not known, although he was bom sometime before A.D. 50 and died
62

sometime after A.D. 120.

Plutarch wrote mostly about soldiers and statesmen, both

63

Greek and Roman.

Twenty-three of these biographies survive, most of them arranged

in pairs of parallel Greek and Roman lives.^"^ Many of the men he wrote about either
served as mercenaries or had some dealings with them, thus making his work important
to the issue at hand.
The worthiness of Plutarch as a historical source must be evaluated on a

case

basis. Because he wrote long after the fact in the case of the Greek biographies, he was
65

Thus

dependent upon previous sources, which would have varied in veracity and detail,
some of his biographies are more trustworthy than others. There are, however, certain
themes that run throughout his work. One is his concern was morals, of which he
66

believed a study of the men of history could provide examples, both good and bad.
Another theme was his concern with people rather than events; thus he often chose to
include anecdotes that may or may not have been tme in order to illustrate the character
of the chosen subject.^^ His biographies are nonetheless important in helping to
understand the Greek world as a whole.

61
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II
Mercenary Service in Context

In order to understand the motivations for mercenary service and for hiring them,
one must first examine the historical context in which they served. In the ancient world,
and especially the Classical and Archaic periods, the East was a place of almost constant
conflict and it is these tensions and wars which created the need for professional
soldiers.’ In this chapter, the history of the East will be examined, as it is the primary
region in which Greek mercenary hoplites were employed. Both the various kingdoms of
the region and their utilizations of mercenaries will be studied in order to provide a clear
picture of what necessitated the need for mercenaries.
The East had been dominated by the Assyrian Empire since the reign of TiglathPilsar I, which began in 1116 B.C. Cruel, oppressive, and militarily powerful, the
Assyrian Empire faced and withstood many challenges in its long existence. By the reign
of its last king, Ashurbanipal (688-625 B.C.), however, Assyria had become exhausted by
near constant wars and internal revolts. The sturdy peasantry, the backbone ofthe army,
had been worn down, and the kingdom was forced to rely on foreign mercenaries. These
hired hands would not be sufficient to save it from internal troubles, however.
In 627 B.C., the often rebellious Assyrian satrapy of Babylonia began yet another
revolt.^ This uprising would be different from those before it, however. By the next
year, Nabopolassar, the former satrap, had set himself up as the founder of the eleventh
dynasty of Babylon, thus beginning the Neo-Babylonian (also known as the Chaldean)
'For the purposes of this paper, the East is defined as the regions of Asia Minor, the Levant, Egypt, and
Mesopotamia. See figure 1, p. 33 for a map ofthe region and its various empires.
■ Dupoy and Dupoy 1993, pp. 9-13.
'Roux 1992, p. 373.
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kingdom/ This new kingdom was able to hold off Assyria until another rebellious
province. Media, entered the conflict in 615 B.C. The Babylonians and the Medes
together fought the Assyrians, and by the end of612 B.C., Nineveh, the capital of
Assyria, had been captured and the empire was dead/ The land was divided between the
two victorious states, with Babylonia taking the south-west portion of the former
Assyrian Empire,from slightly east of the Tigris River to Egypt, and Media getting the
lands east and to the north of the Tigris, stretching into Asia Minor/
The new Babylonian kingdom quickly expanded following its independence from
Assyria. In 605 B.C., Nebuchadnezzar, son of the king, defeated the Egyptians and their
Greek mercenaries at Carchemish and drove Egypt out of Syria and Palestine.^ After
becoming king himself the next year, Nebuchadnezzar brought in the golden age of the
new Babylonian kingdom. The city of Babylon became a famous and beautiful center,
with its hanging gardens and great walls.^ Unfortunately, the kings following him were
far weaker, and, after his reign, the kingdom began to decline until its fall in 539 B.C.^
Until 673 B.C., the province of Media was made up several tribes of people who
were controlled (although not necessarily directly ruled) by the Assyrians and who paid
10

tribute to them.

11

In 673, however, Phroates became king of a united Media,

He was

not able to do much other than hold off the Assyrians, however, and Media was overrun

Roux 1992, p. 374; Dupy and Dupoy 1993, pp. 12-13; Benson 2003, pp. 238-249.
Roux 1992, pp. 375-376; Dupoy and Dupoy 1993, pp. 12-13.
^ Bury 1937, p. 210; Dupoy and Dupoy 1993 p. 13. See figure 2, p. 33.
^ Roux 1992, pp. 378-379; Dupoy and Dupoy 1993, p. 14.
" Bury 1937, p. 210.
Roux 1992, p. 386.
10
CHI 11, p. 110; Dupoy and Dupoy 1993, p. 13.
CHI 11, pp. 113, 115. Herodotus (1.96-102) incorrectly attributes the creation of the Median kingdom to
Phroates’ predecessor Deiocus, who from oriental records appears to have been a rebellious chieftain who
was exiled to Syria by the Assyrians.
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12

by the Scythians in 652 B.C.
13

By 625 B.C., the Scythians had been repelled, and

It was under his reign that Media began the assault against Assyria,

Cyraxes was king,

14

seizing the religious center of Assur in 615 B.C.

Following the downfall of Assyria, the

Median kingdom began to expand in multiple directions. In c. 590 B.C., Armenia was
captured and Cappadocia followed shortly afterward, bringing the Medes to the border of
the powerful kingdom of Lydia.

A war began with the Lydians in 590 B.C. and was

ended five years later with a peace negotiated by Nebuchadnezzar of Babylon.*^ The
Median kingdom also expanded to the east, and by at least the 560’s B.C.(and perhaps as
17

much as a century earlier) the lands of Persia were under the dominion ofthe Medes.
The Median Empire was short lived, however, and was destroyed in 550 B.C. by Cyrus
18

the Great(Cyrus II), the king of Persia.
Persia was a large territory that lay to the east of both Babylon and Media; it
would rapidly became the greatest empire in the region. At the end of the seventh
century B.C., it was divided into two separate kingdoms, both of which were vassals of
19

the Medes.

By the time of the last Babylonian emperor, however, the two kingdoms
20

were united under Cyrus the Great, who rebelled against the Medes in 553 B.C.

Just

three years later, and with the assistance ofthe Babylonians, he became king of both the
21

Medes and Persians.

In 547 B.C., the Persians conquered the Lydians, and in 539 B.C.,

12

Bury 1937, p. 209; C///II, p. 113.
CHIW, p. 113.
14
C///II, p. 113; Roux 1992, p. 375.
15
Roux 1992, p. 380; Buiy 1937, p. 210.
16
C///1I, p. 126; Roux 1992, p. 380
17
C///II,p. 133.
18
Roux 1992, p. 384.
19
CWIIp. 145; Roux 1992, p. 383.
20
Roux 1992, pp. 383, 384.
21
Roux 1992, p. 384.
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Babylonia followed."" With the conquest of Egypt in 525 B.C., Persia became master of
23

the East."

The kingdom of Lydia has been mentioned previously and it is now time to take
a closer look at this relatively small state, for it plays an important part in the story of
Greek mercenaries. The kingdom of Lydia lay in central Anatolia and had its capital at
Sardis.""^ Not much is known of the Lydians before 700 B.C. In Homer,the land that
would later be inhabited by them was instead attributed to the Maeonians, allies of Troy.
It is generally accepted that these Maeonians were replaced by the Lydians at some
unknown point."^ In 700 B.C., the old dynasty of the Heraclids was replaced by that of
the Mermnads, and a new age of Lydian expansion began.^^ Gyges,the first Mermnad
king, set about expanding to the north and also attacking the Greek cities ofthe west
coast of Asia Minor."^ According to Herodotus, his only success was capturing the
citadel of Colophon."^ If this assertion is true, a reason for his lack of success might be
29

found in the fact that Gyges had to contend with the raiding Cimmerians.

These

invaders swept down from the north, destroying Lydia’s more powerful neighbor Phyrgia
30

and even capturing the city of Sardis,

Alyattes, the third king after Gyges, was able to
31

expel the Cimmerians both from Lydia and from Asia Minor as a whole in c. 585 B.C.
In the following years, Lydia expanded until it covered almost the entire Anatolian

22

Roux 1992, pp. 385-386.
Dupoy and Dupoy 1993, p. 24.
24
Bean 1972, p. 22; Hdt. p. 625 n 7. See figures 2,4, pp. 33-34.
25
Bean 1972, p. 260.
26
Hdt. 1.7; Bean 1972, p. 22.
27
Bean 1972, pp. 22, 23.
28
Hdt. 1.14-15
29
Bean 1972, p. 23
10
Bean 1972, p. 23
11
Hdt. 1.16; Bean 1972, pp. 261-262.
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32

peninsula.

This expansion brought it contact with the Persian Empire, which destroyed
33

it in 547 B.C. as stated above.

The final kingdom to be considered is that of Egypt. Although somewhat
geographically removed from the events in the area, the country had a vested interest in
the affairs of the region, especially in the Levant and Syria. Egypt was first unified under
34

a single monarch sometime between 3100 and 2600 B.C.

Because of its relative

isolation, it did not become a major player on the world scene until 1546-1507 B.C. when
the Egyptian pharaohs Amenhophis I and Thutmosis I pushed Egyptian armies south into
35

Nubia, west into Libya, and northeastwards all the way to the Euphrates River.

The

Egyptian pharaohs fought many wars in the following years, and the size and fortunes of
the kingdom rose and fell. In c. 730 B.C., Egypt was conquered by the Nubians and
36

remained under their control until the Assyrians drove them in 671 B.C.

Assyrian rule

over Egypt would not officially end until 626 B.C., although the pharaoh during the
majority of this rule, Psammetichus I (reigned c. 663-609 B.C.), was able to act with
37

increasing autonomy as the power of his overlord declined during this period.
It was during this time that the first definitive case of Eastern utilization of
mercenaries occurred, for Psammetichus hired a body of Ionian and Carian
mercenaries.38 Although the existence of these mercenaries is generally unquestioned,
there is much debate about how exactly they were utilized. According to Herodotus, the
lonians and Carians were a “company of sea-raiders” who had been forced to land in

32

^ Hdt. 1.16-28; Bean 1972, p. 262.
Bean 1972, p. 262.
34
Dupoy and Dupoy 1993, p. 4.
35
Dupoy and Dupoy 1993, p. 5.
36
Dupoy and Dupoy 1993, p. 7.
37
Dupoy and Dupoy 1993, p. 7; Benson 2004, pp. 221-254.
38
Hdt. 2.152-154; Diod. Sic. 1.66, 67.1-3, 68.5; Broadman 1980, pp. 114-115; Trundle 2004, p. 44.
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39

Egypt by bad weather.

These men wore bronze armor, which the Egyptians had never

40

before seen.

Psammetichus had been told by an oracle shortly before that

vengeance would come from the sea, whence bronze men would appear,” and so when
word came to him that bronze men had come out of the sea, he immediately offered them
41

friendship and the promise of rewards if they would help him.

Diodorus Siculus gives a

very similar account, except, according to him,Psammetichus formally requested the
42

mercenaries from the Lydian king Gyges.
The true proceedings in this incident may have more complicated than either of
these scenarios, for modem historians have pieced together both from literary and other
sources a more complete picture. It seems that in the beginning at least, Psammetichus I
43

was a loyal vassal of Assyria who brought peace and stability to the region,

After

attaining his mercenaries, however, he used them to neutralize the eleven kings of other
44

Egyptian city-states.

These kings had been appointed by the Assyrian king
45

Ashurbanipal after his conquest of Egypt,

Psammetichus may have undertaken this

consolidation without the authorization of his master Ashurbanipal, thus making this the
incident mentioned on the Rassam Cylinder, which records a prayer of Ashurbampal that
the gods would smite Gyges for sending aid to Psamettichus, who had “cast off the yoke
„46

of my sovereignty.

Alternatively, he may have used these mercenaries directly against

39

Hdt. 2.152.
Hdt. 2.152. The veracity of this statement is debatable.
41
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42
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43
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47

the Assyrians and then against the twelve kings.

In either event, Greek mercenaries

48

came to Egypt at least by the 650s B.C.

The mercenaries of Psammetichus settled on the land he had given them and
established a colony there, thus assuring that the pharaohs would have the mercenaries’
49

fighting skills at their disposal.

From these mercenaries grew a class of mixed-race
50

professional soldiers who saw much use in future wars.

A Greek shield found in a

ruined house at Carchemish suggests that Pharaoh Necho may have employed Greek
mercenaries in the force that took the city in 609 B.C. and garrisoned it against the
51

Babylonians until the Greek’s defeat in 605 B.C.

It is also known that Greek

mercenaries accompanied Psammetichus II (Herodotus’ “Psammis”)in his successful
52

expedition against Nubia in 591 B.C.

Evidence for Greek participation in the Nubian

campaign comes from graffiti cut into the legs of colossal statues of Ramses II at Abu
53

Simbel, in Upper (southern) Egypt.
44

The largest of these Greek inscriptions, written by
»54

Archon son of Amoibichos” and “Pelekos son of Eudamos,

mentions that the army of

the pharaoh sailed down the Nile with a “Psammetichos, son of Theokles,” and were lead
by an Egyptian named Potasimto.

55

47

Lloyd 1988, pp. 132-135; Shaw 2002, p. 371.
Benson 2003, p. 226. Lloyd (1988, p. 132) dates the coming ofthe mercenaries to 660 BC.
49
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50
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51
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52
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53
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1933, p. 5; Boardman 1980, pp. 115-116.
54
The assertion has been made that this last name is a bit of humor and should be read as “Axe, son of
Nobody.” See Bum 1974, p. 96.
Boardman 1980, p. 115. Fig 135 on this page has a sketch of the original graffito. The Psammetichos
mentioned here is not the king, and was,judging by the name of his father, at least half-Greek. Potasimto
is actually a Greek contraction of a Egyptian name, and this officer may have been half-Greek as well. See
Benson 2003, p. 288.
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In 570 B.C.. Pharaoh Apries (the Egyptian Hophra) led a mercenary army of
30,000 Carians and lonians against a usurper Amasis(Ahmose II) and a force of native
56

Egyptian warriors.

The revolt followed a failed expedition against the Greek-founded
57

city of Cyrene in Libya.

The expedition was carried out by the native Egyptian warrior
58

class, who felt they had been sent to their deaths.

Nationalism and general anti-Greek

sentiment also played a part in the revolt, since the Egyptians had lost to Greeks and the
59

warrior class objected to being pushed out by the mercenary newcomers,

Apries was

able to escape from Egypt with his mercenaries before he was killed and, in his absence,
Amasis was crowned Pharaoh.

Apries returned with his mercenaries and possibly
61

Babylonian reinforcements to retake his crown in 567 B.C. and was defeated.

If there

were any mercenary survivors of the encounter, Herodotus does not mention what
happened to them afterwards. It is known, however, that Amasis later took the remaining
Greek mercenaries in Egypt out of the land given to them by Psammetichus and relocated
62

them to Memphis to serve as his bodyguard,

Such an action on his part would suggest

63

that he did not deal with them harshly.

Greek mercenaries continued to play an important role in Egypt during and
64

shortly after the invasion of the country by the Persians under Cambyses in 525 B.C.

If

Herodotus is to be believed, a Greek mercenary was crucial to the Persian success in the
campaign. Phanes of Halicarnassus was an Ionian Greek in the service of Amasis who

56

Hdt. 2.161-163, 169; Bum 1974, p. 96; Benson 2003, pp. 311-312.
Hdt
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defected to Cambyses after becoming “dissatisfied” over something in the court of the
pharaoh. It was Phanes who told Cambyses the best way to get into Egypt, along with
other secrets of Amasis.

65

This story is considered suspicious by some modem

historians, who attribute it to Herodotus’ propensity to make great events stem from the
66

actions of one individual.

In any case, the Egyptians under Pharaoh Psamthek III

(Herodotus* Psammenticus) met the Persians near Pelusium with an army that consisted
67

of an unknown number of Ionian and Carian mercenaries.

The Egyptians were defeated
68

there and fled to Memphis, where they were besieged and eventually defeated,

The

loss of the ancient capital meant the loss of the entire kingdom to the Persians.
After the defeat of the Egyptians, the Greek mercenaries of Amasis may have
been retained by Cambyses and used in his failed campaign against the Nubians and
69

Ammonians (dwellers around the oasis at Siwa).

Herodotus merely mentions that the

Greeks were left at Memphis and allowed to sail home after the return of Cambyses. It is
hard to know with certainty whether the Greeks so described were the mercenaries of
70

Amasis, as Parke argues, or Greek subjects of Persia, as Boardman does,

Herodotus’

narrative does mention both Cypriotes and Lesbians as serving under Cambyses before
71

the Egyptian campaign and it is likely these Greeks were subjects.
The usage of Greek mercenaries does not end with the conquest ofthe kingdom
by Persia, however. In 404 B.C., Egypt regained its independence, and internal problems

65
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72

within the Persian Empire kept them from responding for half a century.

In 374/3 B.C.,

the Persian king Artaxerxes II launched the first of the campaigns to regain Egypt. This
campaign was defeated, although not much is known about the composition of the
73

defending Egyptian force.

In 360 B.C., the Egyptians went on the offensive with an

attack against Persian-held Phoenicia, for which Pharaoh Tachos(Taos) hired a force of
74

Greek mercenaries.

At least some of these mercenaries were hired by the Spartan king
75

Agesilaus, to whom Tachos had given money for the purpose,

Along with these
76

mercenaries, Agesilaus also brought a thousand Spartiate warriors with him.

Once in

Egypt, the Spartan king was given command of only the mercenaries, much to his
77

disappointment.

His treatment continued to grate upon him, and when Tachos’ cousin
78

Nectanebo revolted, Agesilaus switched sides and joined him.

Agesilaus also helped

Nectanebo secure his throne against another rival, an unnamed pretender from the city of
79

Mendes.

Agesilaus then made preparations to return to Sparta with the money he had
80

received as a gift from Nectanebo, but died before he reached his home city,

Chabrias

81

of Athens also served as a mercenary under Tachos, in command of the fleet.

72
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82

In 343 B.C., the Persians launched their final campaign against Egypt.
Artaxerxes III personally led the invasion, although he sent two of his satraps to subdue
83

Phoenicia before he arrived with the main force.

Pharaoh Nectanebo II sent 4,000

Greek mercenaries under Mentor of Rhodes to Tennes, the king of Sidon, to help the
84

latter resist the satraps,

Tennes was able to repulse the satraps but feared that he would

be unable to resist the army of Artaxerxes and so decided to secure his own life by
making a secret deal with the Persian king.^^ Artaxerxes agreed to the plan and Tennes,
86

with the help of Mentor, led the Persian king and his forces into the city,

Artaxerxes

betrayed Tennes, killed him and burned his city to the ground, as had been his plan all
87

along.

Mentor and his mercenaries were given a place in the Persian army as a reward
88

for his betrayal.

The Persians continued their march on Egypt, which was defended by

native forces and a force of 2,000 Greek mercenaries under Diophantes of Athens and
89

Lamios of Sparta.

Another two Greek mercenary contingents are known to have acted

as garrisons, one at the important fortress of Pelusium and another at an unspecified
90

location.

After the loss of Pelesium, Nectanebo panicked and fled first to Memphis and

then out of the country to Ethiopia.^* This loss ofthe capital city brought about the return
of Persian dominance and a loss of Egyptian independence that would last until modem
times.
82
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Like the Egyptians, the Persians also used large numbers of Greek mercenaries
when it suited their purposes. At least in the beginning, such service seems to be limited
to the satraps, rather than to the king. Often, the satraps hired mercenaries as
92

bodyguards, in much the same fashion as the Greek tyrants of the time.

During the

Peloponnesian War, a few of these mercenaries were loaned out by the Persians to serve
as advisors for those cities fighting against Athens. As time went on, they also began to
93

be employed to serve garrison duty in Persian cites.

By the fourth century B.C., the Persian Empire was beginning to weaken severely.
Revolts became common,leading to the loss of provinces(such as the Egyptian affair
mentioned above) and a general disordering of the empire. It also created a great demand
for Greek mercenaries, first from the revolting satraps, and then from the Persian king,
who needed forces to match those of unfaithful govemors.^"^ The most dramatic and well
known of these satrapal armies of mercenaries was the Cyreans.
The Cyreans(more commonly known as the Ten Thousand) were a body of
95

Greek mercenaries hired by Cyrus the Younger, brother of the Persian king,

Despite

the name commonly given to them, they actually numbered closer to thirteen thousand,
including some 10,600 hoplites and 2,300 light infantry.^^ Along with an uncertain
number of Persian troops, this army marched on Susa^ one of the capitals of the Persian
97

Empire.

The mercenaries actually defeated the forces of the king at Cunaxa, but Cyrus
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Parke 1933, p. 15;Xen.
1.1.2
Parke 1933, p. 15, esp. n. 1, p. 23; Xen. An. 1.1.6 may indicate that Greeks were serving in garrisons
already.
94
Parke 1933, pp. 21,23.
95
'
Xen. An. 1.1.1, 1.1.6; Parke 1933, pp. 23-24
96
Xen. An. 1.2.3, 1.2.9; Parke (1933, p. 26)gives 9,600 hoplites and 2,200 light infantry.
97
Dupoy and Dupoy 1992, p. 37.
93
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98

was killed in the battle, thus ending the contract.

Surrounded by the Persians and other

hostile enemies and without either an employer or leaders(most of whom had been
murdered treacherously by the victorious Persians), the Cyreans nonetheless were able to
force their way back to the Black Sea, where some ofthem returned home and others
99

continued to serve as mercenaries under the Spartan Thibron.

The expedition took

100

place between 401 and 399 B.C.

The success of the Cyreans did not hurt the reputation of mercenaries in the eyes
of the Persians, and indeed may have even helped. It was after Cyrus’ attempt at the
throne that Artaxerxes II, the Persian king, first used Greek mercenaries on a wide scale
101

in his campaign against Evagoras of Cyprus in 381 B.C.

Apparently pleased with their

service, he enlisted a large number for his first campaign against Egypt, which was lead
102

by the satrap Pharanabazus, with the Athenian Iphicrates acting as a general,

Although

this expedition failed, another attempt was launched in 372 B.C., with Timotheus the
103

Athenian serving in the place of Iphicrates.

This expedition too failed, due to the
104

desertion of the Persian commander, Datames.

This same Datames would later find

himself under attack by the mercenary armies of the satrap of Ionia, who employed three
105

thousand Greek mercenaries.

The satrap of Phrygia, when revolting in support of
106

Datames, hired a large force of mercenaries directly from the Greek mainland,

In

addition to renting himself out himself to Egypt, Agesilaus of Sparta served the satrap
98

Battle: Xen. An. 1.8-10; Death of Cyrus: Xen. An. 1.8.27-29. Xenophon’s account ofthe battle is highly
problematic, as is the exact location of Cunaxa. See Whitby 2004, pp. 225-228.
Parke 1933, pp. 33-41. Service under Thibron: Xen. Hell. 3.1.1-6.
100
Dupoy and Dupoy 1993, p. 37
101
Isoc. 4.135; Diod. Sic. 15.2-4, esp. 15.3.2; Parke 1933, pp. 61-62.
102
Diod. Sic. 15.41.1; Parke 1933, pp. 105-106.
103
Parke
1933, pp. 106-107.
104
Parke
1933, p. 107.
105
Parke
1933,
p. 107.
106
Parke 1933. p. 107.
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Ariobarzanes in 364 B.C. in order to raise money so that Sparta could hire its own
107

mercenaries.

Greek mercenaries also played an important part in the failed satraps’
108

revolt in 362 B.C.

Despite the failure of this well-planned revolt and the subsequent

law issued by Artaxerxes III Ochus ordering the disbanding of satrapal mercenary armies.
109

satraps continued to revolt and use Greek mercenaries in those rebellions.
The rise of Philip II of Macedon and his son Alexander III began a new, and final,
period of Persian utilization of Greek mercenaries. Their first use in this conflict was at
the Thracian city of Perinthus, where the Persian satraps of Asia Minor sent a force under
no
The mercenaries
Apollodorus of Athens to lift a siege by Phillip’s forces in 340 B.C.
were successful at Perinthus, and subsequent victories followed at Cyzius(336 B.C.) and
in

the Troad (335 B.C.), with Memnon of Rhodes leading the mercenaries in both battles.
At the Battle of Granicus River in May of 334, Alexander faced a Persian army made up
112

of large number of Greek mercenaries,

The exact number of mercenaries involved is

an issue of some debate, with Arrian stating that nearly 20,000 Greek mercenaries were
present in the Persian army, while a more modem estimate places the figure at 7,500,
with Memnon leading the main body offour to five thousand mercenaries and the satraps
113

providing the rest.

Whatever the case, Alexander won the battle and slaughtered a

large number of the mercenaries and sent the survivors to Macedonia to serve as
114

slaves.

107

Xen. /tges. 2.26; Parke 1933, p. 109.
Diod. Sic. 15.90-92; Parke 1933, p. 110.
109
Parke 1933, pp. 122-125.
no
Diod. Sic. 16.75; Parke 1933, pp. 177-178.
111
Diod. Sic. 16.76.1-4, 17.7.8-10; Parke 1933, pp. 178-179.
108

1 12

m^ Dupoy and Dupoy 1993, p. 53.
Arr. Anah. 1.14; Guthrie 1999, p. 130.
I 14
AvT.Afiah. 1.16.5.
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The only mercenaries Alexander had to face for the next year were those in
115

garrisons, many of whom fled after hearing of what had transpired at the Granicus.
While Alexander was marching around Asia Minor, Memnon, having been appointed
supreme commander of the Persian navy, put into motion a plan of his own devising, in
which he used the superior Persian navy to capture islands in the Aegean, which he then
116

garrisoned with mercenaries.

His plan was to proceed thus across the Aegean Sea and
117

bring the war to Greece and Macedonia.
118

before the plan could be completed,

Unfortunately for the Persians, he died

The activities of Memnon aside, the next large

body of mercenaries Alexander faced was at Issus(333 B.C.). Once again, figures vary
as to the number of Greek mercenaries, but the two to three thousand suggested by
119

Guthrie seems reasonable.

After this battle, mercenaries are not really heard from

again until the final battle at Gaugamela(331 B.C.), where their numbers are again
120

disputed,

Greek mercenaries continued to work for Darius until his murder by Bessus

in July of 331 B.C., after which they fled into the mountains of Bactria and subsequently
121

surrendered to the Macedonians.

The Egyptians and Persians were not the only Eastern kingdoms to use Greek
mercenaries. They were, however, the two with the longest and most well-documented
history of so doing. The Assyrians, the Babylonians, and the Lydians are also suspected
to have used mercenaries in their wars, although the evidence for their utilization of

115

Parke 1933, p. 181.
Arr. Anab. 2.1.
117
An*. Anab. 2.1.
118
Arr. Anab. 2.1.
119
Guthrie 1999, pp. 130-131. See Parke (1933, pp. 183-184)for how the 30,000 Greek mercenaries
attested to by ancient sources cannot be right. Parke himself suggests 8,000, but this number still seems
too
high.
120
Parke 1933, pp. 184-185.
121
Arr.
3.16, 3.21, 3.23; Parke 1933, p. 185.
116
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mercenaries is slight and circumstantial, especially in comparison with that available for
Egypt and Persia. Nonetheless, what little evidence there is bears mentioning. The
Assyrians may have been the original employers of the lonians and Carians used by
122

Psammetichus I.

In this case, the mercenaries would have been sent by the Ass)Tian

king to his vassal as reinforcements for some unknown task. Alternatively, the
mercenaries in questions may have been initially employed by Gyges, who sent them to
Psammetichus as a favor or in exchange for some unmentioned sum. Even if these
particular mercenaries were not sent by the Lydian king, he is known to have sent troops
of some form to the pharaoh to fight against the Assyrians, and is also suspected of hiring
123

Greek and Carian mercenaries.

Finally, Babylonian use of mercenaries is attested to

by a poem of Alcaeus, in which he praises his brother who had served as a mercenary that
124

kingdom, perhaps under Nebuchadnezzar.

It seems that the East in Archaic and Classical times was a place of great turmoil
and conflict that created a need for armed troops. All the kingdoms that rose and fell in
the region are at least suspected of having hired Greek mercenaries, and Egypt and Persia
are both known to have hired large bodies ofthem frequently. In the case of Egypt, the
history of the country in its last years of independence is inextricably tied with that of the
Greek mercenaries that it hired, thus showing the importance that they could assume.
Persia’s hiring of mercenaries is less important to its history, but instrumental in
understanding both the value and importance of Greek mercenaries and their limitations.

122

Niemeier 2001, p. 17.
Rassam Cylinder II, 114-115; Niemeier 2001, p. 17.
124
Ale. fr. 350 Cambell, cited in Sage 1996, pp. 150-151; Niemeier 2001, p. 18.
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(Adapted from p. 5, Shepherd, W.H. 1926. Historical Atlas, New York.)

Map 2. Oriental Kingdoms, c. 600 B.C.
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Ill
The Utilization of Greek Mercenaries

That the Persian Empire and the kingdom of Egypt made extensive use of
mercenaries cannot now be denied. The question remains, however, about what
motivated them to do so. A need for soldiers does not alone explain the hiring of
mercenaries, especially in the case of the Persian Empire, whose potential native
manpower would have been enormous. In this chapter, the fighting styles of all the
involved parties will be examined in order to see what the hiring of hoplite mercenaries
would have brought to the Egyptians and Persians. Also, certain general advantages and
disadvantages of mercenary armies will be examined.
As has been stated previously, most of the mercenaries hired in the East were
hoplites.' It is now time to examine the Greek hoplite and see what exactly the
employers were buying when they hired him. In simplest terms, a hoplite is a type of
heavy infantry soldier. Hoplites bore the brunt of most of the fighting done by the
Greeks of the Archaic and Classical periods, although the peltast and the Macedonian
phalangite would see increasing importance toward the end ofthe Classical period.^
Hoplite warfare is first seen around the middle ofthe seventh century B.C. There
is some debate as to how and why hoplite warfare developed, especially in the light of the
way battles were conducted in the Iliad and Odyssey? One of the first literary evidences
of the existence of hoplites can be found in the work of the Spartan poet Tyrtaeus in the

'Trundle 2004, p. 51.
-Parke 1933, pp. 236-237.
^ Hackett 1989, p. 54. For a summary of the two main sides of the debate and a presentation of a new one,
see van Wees. 2000.
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middle of the seventh century/ Hoplite soldiers also begin appearing in art at this time,
most famously on the Chigi vase, painted c. 640 B.C/ The most obvious and perhaps
most important pieces of a hoplite’s equipment was his hoplon, or shield. Indeed, it has
been theorized that the development of this shield is what led to the development of the
hoplite panoply and style of fighting.^ The hoplon was circular, with an average diameter
of three feet, and weighed 15 pounds.^ It was made of wood, perhaps covered with
bronze or bronze attachments and would have been doubly secured to the left arm by an
armband in the center and a handgrip on the right rim.* This shield and a thrusting spear
measuring six to eight feet in length and terminating in an iron or bronze head were the
only weapons a soldier had to have to be considered a hoplite.^ Many Greek soldiers,
however, carried a sword as a secondary weapon, except for the Spartans, who carried a
10

long dagger instead.

Armor was not a necessary part of hoplite equipment, but it became increasingly
common in the Archaic and Classical periods, although its usage did see a decline in later
years as soldiers began to seek increased mobility.*^ A basic panoply would have
included a pair of greaves to protect the legs, a cuirass to shield the upper body, and a
12

helmet to cover the head; all of these items would have been made of bronze,

Increased

protection would have been provided by the less common additions of a bronze plate
suspended by chains or thongs to the bottom of the cuirass to protect the abdomen, and

‘’Tyrtaeus fr. 11 West, cited in Sage 1996, pp. 28-29; Racket 1989, p. 54.
^ van Wees 2000, p. 137 fig. 9. The Chigi vase is open to interpretation as well, see pp. 134-142.
^ It may have leant its name to the solider as well, although there are those who disagree. Contrast van
Wees 2004, pp. 47-48, 266 n. 4, and Anderson 1991, p. 15.
^ van Wees 2004, p. 48.
* van Wees 2004, p. 48.
^ van Wees 2004, p. 48.
Anderson 1991, pp. 26-27.
" Hanson 1991, pp. 63-64.
'■ Ducrey, pp. 52-54, trans. J. Lloyd, New York, 1986.
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bronze shoulder guards. Some hoplites also wore valances of leather strips which would
have provided cover and perhaps even limited protection. These were worn under the
13

armor and extended from the bottom of the cuirass down to the thighs.

Surviving

illustrations show the presence of tunics and some padding under the armor, likely for
14

comfort and for the prevention of chafing.
It seems that mercenary hoplites preferred to wear armor. The Greeks who came
to the aid of Psammetichus obviously wore such armor, earning them the appellation of
‘‘bronze men.

●●15

It is unlikely that such a description ofthem would have been merited if

they had simply been carrying a sword and shield, although the name might only imply
the wearing of helmets, which was uncommon among Egyptians.

16

The mercenaries of

Dionysius 1 were provided with hoplite armor by the tyrant, some confiscated from his
own citizens and some made especially for the force by his armorers,

17

The evidence for

the use of armor by the Cyreans is somewhat inconclusive, although the author tends to
favor the idea that they would have worn armor.

18

One particular incident that has been

debated is the parade scene at Tyriaeum, where Cyrus showed off his troops to the
Cicilian queen.

19

In recording that review of the Cyreans, Xenophon notes that “[...] the

Greeks all had helmets of bronze, crimson tunics, and greaves, and carried their shields

13

Ducrey, pp. 54-58, trans. J. Lloyd, New York, 1986.
Ducrey, pp. 51 fig 33, 56 fig 38, 58 fig 40, trans. J. Lloyd, 1986; Hacked 1989, p. 58 picture caption.
15
Hdt. 2.152.
16
Shaw 1991, p. 42.
17
Diod. Sic. 14.10.4, 14.41.3; McKechnie 1989, p. 82.
18
For a good summary of the arguments and a bibliography of further reading on the topic, see Whitby
2004,
pp. 218-220.
19
Xen. An. 1.2.16-17.
14
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uncovered..,20 Although no mention is made of cuirasses, it is possible that at least some
21

if not all the Greeks were wearing them beneath their cloaks.

Hoplites generally fought in a phalanx formation, thought to have been developed
22

If

as a way to provide protection to the exposed right side ofthe individual soldier.

such is the case, than it would have had developed after the introduction ofthe panoply.
As with the shield, however, there is much debate about when the phalanx was
23

introduced and why.

In the phalanx, the soldiers stood grouped closely together, with

each man's exposed right side being covered by the shield ofthe man to his right.^"^ The
depth of the formation would vary, depending upon force size and terrain."^ In such a
formation, cohesion and discipline would have been more important than individual
26

prowess, an important factor given that most Greeks were not professional soldiers.
The spear was wielded in the right hand and typically used to slash at the throats of
27

enemy soldiers.”

There is some debate about what actually happened when hoplite armies met on
the field. One theory states that the two armies charged toward one another and met in a
great collision, the goal of which was to force one side offthe field of battle by sheer
force, while the other view holds that the opposing lines met and engaged in fierce melee

20
21
22
23

Xen./4/7. 1.2.16-17.
Whitby 2004, pp. 218-220.
van Wees 2000, p. 127.
van Wees 2000 deals with the debate well.

■'* Anderson 1991, pp. 16, 22. Van Wees (2000) argues against the traditional interpretation by saying that
hoplites faced their opponents at a 90 degree angle and thus fought in a looser formation.
25
Hacket 1989, pp. 58-59.
26
This is not to say that Greek citizen-soldiers were untrained or inexperienced in warfare, both of which
statements are false. They were not professional in the sense that they did not undertake soldiering as an
occupation.
27
Hacket 1989, p. 59.
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28

When facing the Persians and their large number

until one side gained the upper hand.

of archers at Marathon in 490 B.C., the Athenians and their allies the Plataeans closed
29

with the Persians by running in order to avoid the missiles.

When the dispositions of

mercenaries are mentioned in the sources, they are always standing together in close
formation, either in a phalanx or in something that could be quickly turned into one if
needed. When the Cyreans came up against the forces of Artaxerxes at Cunaxa,for
instance, they were deployed on the right of the line in a phalanx that was able to crush
30

the left wing of the Great King’s army.

When Alexander the Great faced Darius’ Greek
31

mercenaries at Granicus, these too were drawn up into formation.
Not all Greek soldiers were hoplites, however. Most Greek armies contained at
least some specialist troops, and indeed these soldiers may have outnumbered hoplites in
most ancient Greek armies of the Classical period.^" Their lack of mention in records
33

may have resulted from being looked down upon by historians and society in general.
Specialist troops were usually divided into two categories: light infantry {psiloi) and
peltasts.'^'’ Light infantry were men with no defensive armor who typically carried missile
35

weapons such as javelins, bows,or even rocks,

Peltasts formed a sort of middle ground

between the psiloi and hoplites in that they carried small, crescent-shaped wicker or
leather shields (pelte) as a defense and were typically armed with heaver weapons such as
36

a pair ofjavelins or a thrusting spear.

Both kinds of specialist troops operated in their

28

van Wees 2004, pp. 184-185.
Hdt. 6.112; Racket 1989, p. 60.
^0
Xen.An. 1.8.5, 1.8.17-21.
."U
Ait. a nab. 1.16.
n
van Wees 2004, p. 62.
33
van Wees 2004, p. 65.
34
Arr. Tact. 3.1-4 cited in Sage 1996, pp. 41-42; van Wees 2004, p. 62.
35
Arr. Tact. 3.1-4, Tyrtaeus fragment 11 West, Thuc. 6.69.2, all cited in Sage 1996, pp. 41-42.
36
Arr. Tact. 3.1-4 cited in Sage 1996, pp. 41-42; Sage 1996, pp. 42-43; van Wees 2004. p. 62.
29

40

own units by Classical times and typically engaged only their counterparts, although on a
37

few occasions they successfully fought hoplite armies,

Certain regions in the Greek

world produced light infantry renowned for certain skills, such as Cretan archers.
38

Rhodian slingers, and Thracian peltasts.

Cavalry also had a role in hoplite warfare, albeit a small one. The use of horses in
Greek warfare was less prevalent than elsewhere in the ancient world, mostly due to the
fact that the terrain of mainland Greece was not congenial to the raising of large breeds of
39

horses or to the upkeep of large numbers of smaller ones,

Cavalry use in Greece itself

was further hindered both by the fact that there was little land suitable for using the
40

animals.

Because of this limitation on size and numbers, most cavalry performed roles

similar to those of the light infantry, since the size ofthe horses precluded the use of
heavy arms and armament that would have been necessitated by the use of shock
41

tactics.

There was no specific way in which cavalrymen were supposed to be equipped.

and most used either a standard hoplite spear and sword or missile weapons such as
javelins. Most horsemen also did not wear armor. In battle, cavalry would protect the
flanks of the hoplite phalanx and also attempt to harass the flanks ofthe enemy with
42

missile weapons launched during a series of fast charges and retreats.

Once the friendly

phalanx had defeated that of the enemy,cavalry could easily attack the retreating hoplites
43

if not countered by the cavalry of their opponent.

The mobility and reach of cavalry

Wees 2004, p. 65.
Counterparts: Thuc. 6.69.2; van Wees 2004, p. 64. Hoplite armies: van
Archers: Pausanias 4.8.3 cited in Sage 1996, p. 43. Slingers: Sage 1996, p. 44. Peltasts. age
, p.
42.
39
Sage 1996, pp. 46-47. The region of Thessaly is a notable exception, and their mercenary cavalry were
famous.
40
van Wees 2004, pp. 67-68.
41
Sage, 1996, p. 47; van Wees 2004, p. 66.
Ducrey, p. 102, trans. J. Lloyd, New York, 1986; van Wees 2004, p. 66.
43
Sage 1996, p. 47.
37
38

41

made it invaluable for raiding enemy land and for preventing enemy infantry from
44

plundering while on the march.
Most mercenary armies, even in the East, likely employed some of these specialist
troops. The force hired by Cyrus in his attempt for the throne is known to have included
at least 2,000 of these infantry, including 200 Cretan archers and 800 Thracian peltasts
45

brought and led by Clearchus.

A body of 200 Rhodian slingers was organized later in

the expedition to meet the threat ofPersian archers and slingers who outranged the Cretan
46

archers.

Some mercenary armies even consisted predominately of specialist troops. In

386 B.C., Chabrias, an Athenian mercenary leader, took a force of 800 peltasts to Egypt
47

to serve under the pharaoh.

Later in the century, the Persian satrap Datames was

attacked by Autophradates, satrap of Ionia, with an army that contained a large
48

contingent of lightly-armed Greek mercenaries.

Greek mercenaries could also serve as cavalrymen. The Cyreans employed
cavalry in their retreat from Persia, although like the Rhodian slingers, these were
49

improvised to meet a specific Persian threat.

The lack of mercenary cavalry in this case

should not be taken to contraindicate its presence generally, since the Cyreans were not
meant to act as an independent force, but rather in concert with native troops raised by
50

Cyrus, including cavalry.

Moreover, Xenophon records that before the Battle of
51

Cunaxa, there was a body of40 Thracian horsemen under Clearchus.

It can only be

assumed that these horsemen were lost in the battle or sometime shortly afterward, since
44

van Wees 2004, p. 66.
Xen./4/7. 1.2.1-9.
46
Xen.An. 3.3.16-20.
47
Diod. Sic. 15.29; Parke 1933, p. 59.
48
Parke 1933, p. 107. The exact date of this event is unknown.
49
Xen.An. 3.3.16-20.
50
Persian cavalry of Cyrus: Xen. An. 1.8.6.
51
Xen.An. 1.5.13.
45

42

Xenophon remarked that the Greeks had no horsemen when they were being harried by
52

the Persians.'

Later commanders in Persian service led contingents of mercenary

cavalry. At the Battle of Granicus River in 334 B.C., the Greek mercenaries serving
under Darius 111 included at least some cavalry and it seems that Memnon,their leader,
53

fought on horseback.

Now that it has been shown what exactly mercenary employers were buying when
they purchased the spears of Greek hoplite mercenaries, it is now time to examine the
native forces of Egypt and Persia. This examination will reveal the strengths and
weaknesses of the employers and show why Greek mercenaries were important to them.
The types and relative quality of the native forces will be discussed, along with the
standard deployments and tactics used by each.
There is little information available to the modem historian about the way in
which Late Period Egypt (c. 712-332 B.C.) conducted war. It seems that for the most
part, the Egyptians during this last phase of independence fought the same way they did
during the New Kingdom period (1550-1050 B.C.), when Egypt was at one of its high
54

points.

This stagnation in tactics and technology may itself be a reason for the reliance

on mercenaries, an idea which will be discussed more below.
The Egyptian army ofthe New Kingdom was made up of both regulars and
55

volunteers.

Many young men joined the army because it offered a chance of promotion

regardless of social rank, a rare opportunity in the otherwise rigid caste system of the

52

Xen. An. 3.3.9

53

Arr. Anah. 1.15; Ashley 1998, p. 195. Although Arrian does explicitly mention the Greeks as cavalry, it
seems unlikely that Memnon would be fighting on foot amidst a cavalry skirmish.
54
Due to its extent, Egyptian history is typically divided into periods for easier study. These periods are a
modem invention and are divided according to the relative power of Egypt at the time. The periods are in
turn broken down into dynasties.
55
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day.'

All was not equal, however, and better birth usually meant more illustrious
57

positions, such as chariot driver,

As time went on, the caste system meant that service

in the army was often passed down from father to son, creating an Egyptian warrior class
(Gr. machimoi) that persisted into the Classical age and that was described, if not totally
58

accurately, by Herodotus.

During times of war, these volunteers would be

supplemented with men chosen by draft, numbering anywhere from one out of every ten
59

eligible Egyptian men to one out of every hundred,

In addition to the native soldiers.
60

there were also auxiliaries made up of vassal peoples or former prisoners of war.
Libyans also began to appear frequently as mercenaries during this time, and some even
● 61

became machimoi.

The Egyptian soldiers of the New Kingdom relied heavily on missile weapons,
especially the bow and the javelin. The Egyptian favored composite bows, which were
made of different layers of material and were stronger and more flexible than wooden
bows.^“ This construction allowed the Egyptian archers to shoot further than opponents
armed with simple wooden bows. Interspersed among the archers were the Egyptian
63

heavy infantry called nakhtu-aa (literary “strong-arm boys”),

These men were armed
64

with either long handled mace axes or a sickle-like short sword known as a khopesh.
These heavy infantry used small shields and may have also worn scale armor, although
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this latter point is contested.^^ Helmets are generally only depicted only in ceremonial
66

contexts.

Chariots were an important part of warfare in the New Kingdom, although their
presence is harder to detect in the Late Period. Based on the New Kingdom evidence.
chariots in large part filled the place that was occupied by cavalry in other armies of the
time, since the Egyptians were not known as horsemen. Egyptian chariots were pulled by
67

two horses and had a crew of one driver and one warrior.

This warrior was armed with

68

a bow, shield,javelins, and a sword.

The main job of a chariot was to protect the
69

infantry, although they would also engage in offensive operations if necessary,

When

they advanced, they would typically do so in a well-spaced line with the warriors onboard
70

using first the bow and then javelins as they closed on the enemy.

Protection from

enemy chariots was provided by a chariot runner who ran along behind the chariot and
71

used a bow and javelin to attack enemy crews,

The crew of a chariot was typically

made up of members of an aristocratic warrior class, and the vehicle would eventually
72

become a part of the royal regalia.
The Egyptian army deployed in self-contained army corps. These corps would
73

march and operate independently, but would be able to support each other if needed.
When preparing for combat, the infantry would be in the center, grouped into companies
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74

of 200-250 men around a standard.
75

followers.

The flanks would be held by the chariots and their
76

The Egyptians preferred to fight using offensive tactics.

By the Late Period, Egypt’s military power had begun to decline from its previous
heights. As was mentioned above, even in the New BCingdom, the Egyptian pharaohs
began to make use of foreign mercenaries to help them in their wars, particularly
Libyans. This need increased over time as manpower requirements began to outstrip
native resources, and mercenaries began to be recruited from a wide range of other
77

peoples, typically with offers of land.

Thus, when the first Greek mercenaries came to
^9

Egypt, they were simply inserted into a pre-existing system of hiring and “Egyptizing
78

foreigners to serve in the military.

Also, as noted above, because of a lack of military

innovation during the time between the New Kingdom and Late Period, the Egyptians
become outmoded on the battlefield. Thus it makes sense that they would purchase large
numbers of Greek mercenaries, since these troops would give them a motivated and
technologically superior force to use on the battlefield.
Now that the Egyptian way of war has been analyzed, it is time to turn our
attention to that of the Persians. The Persian army in the ancient world enjoyed a great
reputation, both due to its size and reported effectiveness. There were, however, certain
deficiencies, the most notable being a lack of trained standing forces. The only
permanent troops the Persians possessed were the royal guard, garrisons in various cities.
79

and a few scattered companies.

The royal guard was drawn from the nobility and was
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80

made up of 1,000 cavalry and 1,000 infantry armed with spears.

In addition to this

force under the king, individual satraps would have their own small guard units, usually
Persian cavalry, although some would hire Greek mercenaries instead of or in addition to
81

native troops.

Cyrus the Younger, employer ofthe Cyreans, provides a good example

of this principle, for he is noted as having both 600 Persian cavalry and 300 Greek
82

hoplites with him as a guard at different times.

The satraps were also in charge ofthe

garrisons within their satrapies, and these positions often contained Greek mercenaries as
83

well.

The most common unit of administration was the 1,000 man hazarabam (Gr.
84

chiliarchy), and this was broken down by decimals into smaller groups.
In times of war, the remainder ofthe troops needed would be taken from the
general populace. Cavalry was raised in part from those who lived on land rented from
the king in exchange for military service, and who were expected to equip themselves to
85

provide said service.

Another source ofcavalry was certain nobles and their retainers,

who likewise would have provided their own equipment and were considered the better
of the two in quality.^^ Some infantry was also raised in the same manner, particularly in
the area of Babylon.

For the most part, however, infantry was raised by levy or by

equipping servants and camp followers with weapons.*^ These levy infantry were
untrained and deliberately kept unarmed until called up for war. Thus they had low
80
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morale and little discipline.^^ Infantry could also be provided by various peoples living
90

inside or on the fringes of the empire and by paid mercenaries from many lands,

These

mercenary soldiers and fringe peoples usually made better soldiers than the native levies.
Because of the extent of their empire, the Persian kings could field an amazing
variety of troops. For the most part, however, they depended on cavalry as the main
91

effective arm and employed them in large numbers.

Indeed, it has been suggested the
92

Persians could have mobilized as many as 40,000-50,000 horsemen at any given time.
Most of these cavalrymen were nobles who had been trained from birth to fight on
horseback and who rode large-breed horses raised on the Nisaean plain.^^ The heavy
cavalrymen were fully armored and rode armored horses, thus providing for a powerful.
94

if slow-moving, shock force.

These cavalrymen carried two five-to-six foot javelins

95

and a sword.

When fighting cavalry, one spear would be thrown and the other retained

for use as a thrusting weapon; when fighting hoplites, both would be thrown and the
96

sword used for close-in fighting.

It was light cavalry, however, that was predominate in

the Persian army, and these were armored men riding on unarmored horses.^^ In the early
days of the Persian Empire,these horsemen would have been archers who would have
98

attacked by advancing and retreating constantly, firing arrows during both maneuvers.
By the time of Alexander’s invasion, however, most light cavalry seemed to be armed
89
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with javelins for fighting infantry in hand-to-hand combat, although some horse archers
99

were retained.

The shift in tactics took place in the early fourth century B.C.

as an

attempt to find a means of effectively combating Greek hoplites, whose armor rendered
100

them largely immune to missiles.
Despite their diversity and their numbers, Persian infantry was largely ineffective.
As mentioned above, most ofthe infantry were levies who had little to no training with
their varied weapons. Herodotus noted that in the army of Xerxes, the Persians
themselves (as opposed to those other nations under their dominion) went into battle
armed with "large wicker shields,” daggers, bows, short spears, and quivers with cane
101

arrows.

The bows of the Persians were four feet long and were effective at longer

ranges than those of the Cretan archers of the Cyreans, although this seems to have more
to do with training and the longer, lighter arrows used by the Persians than with any
102

differences in the bows themselves.

Indeed, the Persians up until the middle ofthe

fourth century seemed to have favored missile troops, and Xenophon records that Persian
archers and slingers gave the Cyreans much trouble during the retreat back to the Black
103

Sea.

By the time of Alexander the Great, however, the Persians seemed to have

switched to the Javelin as the primary infantry weapon in order to counter the heavily104

armed and armored Greeks of the Macedonian phalanx,

Neither archers nor slingers

wore armor during the Macedonian Wars, although the soldiers of Xerxes about whom
105

Herodotus writes are reported as wearing scale armor.
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The levy infantry were supported by small bodies of more professional, better
trained infantry. One of these bodies was the infantry section ofthe Persian royal guard,
known as the ’‘Apple-bearers’* because of the shape oftheir spears’ distinct
106

counterweight.

In addition to these long spears, they also carried shields and/or bows
107

and wore cuirasses.

The primary responsibility ofthe Apple-bearers was to serve as
108

foot guards to the king.

The Cardaces were another group oftrained infantry. These

soldiers were the sons of Persian noble families who were given special physical training
and usually accompanied the king on hunting expeditions or served as a police force as a
109

form of informal military training.

When they reached manhood at age twenty, they

no
began more official training as either cavalrymen or archers, Their weaponry is
variously described by ancient sources as javelins, bows, battleaxes, and wicker
111

shields.

At the Batle of Issus, some apparently fought with hoplite shields, although it
112

is unknown what offensive weapons they used,

The final, and perhaps most important.

group of trained infantry were the Greek mercenaries in Persian employ. These provided
professional, experienced soldiers, as well as good generalship in the form oftheir
113

leaders. They were also the only truly effective heavy infantry the Persians possessed.
In most circumstances, the Persians seemed to have operated with fairly simple
tactics, relying mostly on their superior numbers. Persian armies would be drawn up in
long lines with chariots(if used) placed in the front, infantry placed behind them in the
center, and cavalry positioned on the flanks. At the opening ofthe battle, the chariots
106
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114

would charge into the enemy line in an attempt to disorder it.

The infantry would then

advance into missile range and begin firing, causing the opponent to charge to avoid the
115

arrow's and sling bullets,

Success was usually gained by either wearing down the
116

opponents or outflanking them,

In battles in which cavalry served as the main

offensive force, heavy cavalry would be used for shock charges, with the Persians relying
117

upon both their numbers and their horses’ greater size for the advantage,

This shock

charge could cause great damage upon impact, but the armor ofthe horses hindered the
118

mobility of the heavy cavalryman in any melee combat that might ensue,

Wave after

wave of horsemen would be sent against the opponent in an attempt to wear them
119

down.

The Persians also seemed to have fought in a cautious, defensive manner with a
120

good eye toward terrain.

The primary weakness ofthe Persians seemed to have been a lack of good heavy
infantry. As mentioned before, most ofthe Persian infantry was levied and thus
untrained, with the royal guard providing the only professional soldiers. The troops and
tactics of the Persians worked well enough when fighting other Eastern peoples who used
121

similar tactics, including other Persians,

Their methods, were not, however effective

against Greeks and thus left them with an obvious deficiency. Given the government s
distrust of an armed citizenry, using Greek mercenaries, who would have come armed,
trained, and ideologically neutral, the Persian policy of hiring Greek mercenaries to fill
the gap was sensible.
114
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In addition to helping fill particular deficiencies in the employer’s military.
mercenaries also carried certain general advantages that would make them more
attractive to a potential employer, even one who might have possessed an otherwise
complete military machine. One ofthe most important ofthese advantages was that by
definition, Greek mercenaries had no direct interest in the outcome of a battle or
campaign other than ensuring that they and their employer lived through it. Their
primary concern was pay, and so long as they received it, they would almost always fight.
This would be particularly attractive to those employers who might otherwise have
trouble finding loyal soldiers, such as Persian satraps plotting revolt against their king.
Another important advantage was the fact that mercenaries were professional
122

soldiers in a world of predominately amateur troops,

This was especially the case in

the East, where much of the infantry was drafted as needed from among the general
populace. This experience and familiarity with warfare gave mercenaries a distinct
advantage over most of the soldiers they might face, a definite incentive to an employer
who might not have sufficiently experienced soldiers of his own.
Not only did being professional soldiers give mercenaries an advantage in
combat, it also made them more available. The citizen-soldiers could not be away from
home for long lest their livelihood fail. The mercenary, however, earned his money by
fighting and thus could remain in the field for prolonged periods of time if necessary.
This also made the mercenary an attractive choice for garrisoning and bodyguard duties,
since both would require a large commitment oftime.
Mercenary armies often brought their own leaders with them. Even if these men
typically only commanded their fellows, they were a definite advantage to the employers.
122

Parke 1933. pp. 235-238.
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for they were usually soldiers and leaders of great ability and experience, sometimes
123

possessing more of these qualities then their employers,

Clearchus, hired by Cyrus to

raise and lead the latter's mercenary army, is perhaps one ofthe best examples ofthis
principle. Xenophon said of him that he was “a man who was both fitted for war and
124

fond of war to the last degree.

Clearchus had served Sparta against Athens

throughout the Peloponnesian War, and Xenophon notes that he was brave, self125

possessed and a good commander of men.

Memnon of Rhodes and Agesilaus of

Sparta are two more examples of quality mercenary leadership who have already been
discussed.
There were, however, certain disadvantages inherent in the hiring of the
mercenaries. The lack of any relationship other than money to their employer, while in
some cases a benefit, could become a problem in others. As often happened in the
ancient world, mercenaries could easily decide to work for the enemies oftheir employer
for a variety of reasons. The most obvious cause for defection was the lure of better pay,
although, interestingly enough, there are few accounts ofthis happening in the sources.
Other reasons, however, were more common. Both Phanes and Agesilaus defected from
Egyptian service because they felt slighted by the pharaoh in one way or another.
Survival and the hope for advancement could also lead a mercenary to forsake his
employer, such as when Mentor of Rhodes betrayed the Egyptians and the people of
Sidon.*^^ The lack of an ideological basis for their work also meant that there was little
incentive for mercenary soldiers to fight to the death. Many of the mercenaries in Persian
m
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service fled from or surrendered to Alexander the Great following the Battle of Granicus
127

River, for example.
Mercenaries could also cause problems with the civilian populace of a country.
The regular people might not care for the intrusion of mercenaries, especially ifthey were
leaderless or otherwise unsupervised. Mercenary armies had a tendency to plunder, and
their reputation for this meant that many cities did not want them around. The Cyreans in
particular did not find a warm welcome when they reached the Black Sea, for the Greek
communities there wanted them to keep moving lest the roving soldiers cause
128

problems.

Civilians were not the only ones who might resent the intrusion offoreign

mercenaries. Native soldiers and military leaders might also take a dim view ofthe
newcomers. The revolt of Amasis and the machimoi against Apries and his Greek
mercenaries was motivated as much by the professional jealousy ofthe native warrior
class as it was by nationalism. Similar, Memnon of Rhodes was disliked by the Persian
nobles and military leaders, who ignored his advice with disastrous consequences at
129

Granicus River.

The final, although definitely not least, problem with hiring mercenaries was that
they were prohibitively expensive if hired in large numbers. It is hard to know just how
much a mercenary army would have cost to keep in the field, butjudging by the means
130

that some employers used to pay for them, it was a hefty sum.

Some rulers used tax

increases, some raided sacred treasures, while others, such as the kings of Persia and
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131

Egypt, could tap their countries’ legendary wealth.

The wages for the mercenary army

of Cyrus the Younger, for instance, if paid in full for one month, would have amounted to
132

approximately 3.250 minas or 54 talents.
In summary,the Greek hoplite was a heavy infantry soldier who fought in close
formation with fellow hoplites in a phalanx formation that required discipline in order to
maintain. He may have been supported by cavalry and light troops, either mercenary or
native. The Egyptians needed Greek mercenaries because oftheir stagnation in the areas
of weaponry and tactics and an insufficient supply of native manpower. The Persians
lacked sufficient numbers of quality heavy infantry and relied on Greek mercenaries to
make up for this deficiency. Mercenaries were also attractive because of their ideological
neutrality, professionalism, and good leadership. Mercenaries were problematic in that
they had little to tie them to the employer,they angered citizens, and they were
expensive.
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IV
The Mercenaries Themselves

Now that we have considered the context in which Greek mercenaries served and
the ways in which they were utilized by their Eastern employers, it is time to look at the
mercenaries themselves. While there is much evidence for what mercenaries did in the
ancient world, there is little about who they actually were. Despite this lack of
information, some conclusions can be reached. This chapter will serve to create a portrait
of the men who served in mercenary armies by examining three characteristics:
geographic origination, social status, and age.
Geographic origination is the most well documented characteristic of ancient
mercenaries. The earliest Greek mercenaries, according to Herodotus, are the lonians
and Carians who took service with Pharaoh Psammetichus I. The Carians, at least, were
famed as warriors, for Herodotus credits them with being the first to put crests on
1

helmets, the first to put blazons on shields, and the first to invent the hoplite shield.
Moreover, the area of Caria, in southwest Asia Minor, gained an early reputation in the
ancient world as a place from which to hire mercenaries.^ The lonians were often
mentioned together with the Carians, which seems to indicate that many of the former
also saw mercenary service, if less famously. Indeed, graffiti left on the colossi at Abu
Simbel by Greek mercenaries on the Nubian expedition of Psammetichus II include
inscriptions by two men from cities of Ionia(Teos and Colophon), and a Rhodian.^
lonians and Carians continued serving the Egyptians and, after 525 B.C., their Persian

' Hdt. 1.171.
" Homblower 1982, pp. 5, 16, esp. n. 81.
^ Boardman, 1980, p. 117.
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overlords. Although Canibyses allowed the mercenaries to go home after the failed
expedition against the Ethopians and Ammonians,it is unknown how many took up his
offer and how many, if any, remained in Persian service."^
The mercenary army gathered by Cyrus is the best documented and perhaps most
revealing in terms of geographic origination. Xenophon does not give exact figures on
where all the soldiers came from, but he does give enough information that certain
estimates can be made. After the death of Cyrus and the subsequent march back to Asia
Minor, the Cyreans split into three groups. One was made up ofthe Arcadians and
Achaeans(who were from neighboring regions in the Peloponnesus), who Xenophon said
at that time were "more than four thousand five hundred in number, all hoplites.”^ An
earlier comment in the Anabasis tells the reader that the Arcadians and Achaeans
“constituted more than half of the entire army.”^ Based upon these figures, and assuming
that this group suffered losses proportional to the rest ofthe force, J. Roy has calculated
that the Arcadian and Achaean contingent ofthe mercenary army may have originally
numbered some 6,000 men.^ It is known from Xenophon that the Arcadians made up the
larger share of this group, and Roy speculates, based on population figures and future
manpower requirements for the region, that 4,000 Arcadians and 2,000 Achaeans may
8

have originally joined the expedition.
This proportion of Arcadians fits with what is known about the region from other
contemporary sources. Like Caria before it, Arcadia had gained a reputation by the fifth

'* See above, p. 25.
^ Xen. An. 6.2.16; Roy (2004, p. 272)cites Xenophon as saying “more than four thousand.”
^ Xen. An. 6.2.10; Roy 2004, p. 272.
" Roy 2004, p. 273.
* Roy 2004, p. 273. For more information on Arcadia in the fourth century, see Roy 1999. For more
information about Arcadians as mercenaries, see Fields 2001.

57

century for being a place from which mercenaries could be hired.^ This reputation had
apparently reached as far as Asia, since Cyrus told his recruiters specifically to seek out
«io

^4

as many Peloponnesian soldiers ofthe best sort as they severally could [...].

Given

the fact that these recruiters were able to assemble a force of at least 4,000 Peloponnesian
hoplites without having to leave Ionia, it would seem that there were already large
11

numbers of these Greeks in the region, perhaps already serving as mercenaries,

Roy

speculates that there were even more Peloponnesians already serving as garrison troops in
the Ionian cities of Cyrus.

12

In addition to this large contingent from the Peloponnesus, there were men from
almost every comer of the Greek world. There are 61 men listed by name and city or
region in the Anabasis, and they come from places as diverse as Athens, Sparta, Boeotia,
13

and Lydia, among many others.

In addition to the named mercenaries, contingents of

Aenians, Dolopes, and Rhodians are also mentioned, although no men from these regions
14

are known by name.

It is interesting to note that so many ofthe Cyreans came from

mainland Greece, as opposed to the primarily Asian Greek force that had previously
served the pharaohs of Egypt.
The mercenary armies who served the Persians in the East after the Cyreans
represented just as wide a spectmm of Greek states as the august body that preceded
them, although Sparta and Athens had apparently become more active in sending out
mercenaries. In 380 B.C., the Athenian general Iphicrates was given command of the

^Roy 2004, p. 273.
10
Xen. An. 1.1.6.
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12
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Persian army that was to invade Egypt, although he eventually left in disgust at the lack
15

of progress.

He was replaced in 372 B.C. with another Athenian, Timotheus. In 364

B.C.. the Spartan king Agesilaus was sent as a mercenary leader to the rebel satrap
16

Ariobarzanes, although it is unknown how many Spartans, if any, went with him.

The

army that Artaxerxes 111 led against Egypt in 343 B.C. contained no Spartans or
Athenians, who had declined the king’s invitation, but it did have 1,000 Theban
17

In addition to these men were

mercenaries. 3.000 Argives, and 6,000 Ionian Greeks,

18

the 4,000 mercenaries who had defected from Egypt under Mentor of Rhodes.

When

Greek mercenaries were next used by the Persian king in 340 B.C. against Philip II of
Macedon. they were lead by an Athenian and included among their number Anstomedes
19

of Pherae.

Concerning the home states ofthose Greeks who fought Alexander, little is
20

known, other than that some ofthem came from Athens.

The mercenaries who served the Egyptians in the fourth century were no less of a
diverse group, although as in the case of the mercenaries of Persia, Spartans and
Athenians seemed to have predominated in command roles. Among the mercenaries
known from an inscription found near the Great Pyramid in Egypt are five Athenians, and
21

one man each from Corinth, Boeotia, Nisyrus, Caryanda, and Cyrene.

This inscription

is generally thought to have left by members of one ofthe Athenian Chabrias’
22

expeditions, most likely the one of 386-380 B.C.

Among the mercenaries employed by

15

Diod. Sic. 15.41; Parke 1933, p. 105.
Xen. Ages. 2.26; Parke 1933, p. 109.
17
Diod. Sic. 16.44.1-4. The invitation of Artaxerxes asks for Greeks as “allies” but most histories view
them as mercenaries. See Parke 1933, pp. 166-167 and Benson 2003, p. 501.
18
Diod. Sic. 16.47.6; Parke 1933, p. 167; Benson 2003, p. 501.
19
Parke 1933, p. 178.
20
Arr. Anab. 1.29, 3.6.
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Parke 1933, pp. 59-60.
22
Parke 1933, p. 60. The other possible date is 361-359 B.C.
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the Pharaoh Tachos in his campaign against Persia in 360 B.C. were 1,000 Spartan
citizens under their king Agesilaus, and the Athenian Chabrias, who lead the Egyptian
23

fleet."

When Egypt made its final stand against the Persians in 343 B.C., the mercenary
24

army of 2,000 Greeks was once again in the command of an Athenian and a Spartan.
The social standing of mercenaries is the most heavily debated of all the
characteristics and the one, perhaps, most directly relevant to the motivations that will be
examined in the next chapter. It is also the most difficult to determine in that there is
little information, and what little there is available is biased, subject to differing
interpretations, or both. Also, not all Greek mercenaries would have come from the same
social class, as will be shown below. Given the importance of this characteristic.
however, an attempt must be made to examine it.
Some men of high status were known to have served as mercenaries. Most of
these men are those few mercenaries who are known by name from the ancient historians.
Xenophon is perhaps the best knovm example, while Clearchus is another. Clearchus
25

was a Spartan general and warrior, making him a part of the upper class of Sparta.
Most of the other generals mentioned in the Anabasis were also men of status in their
home communities. Chabrias of Athens and Agesilaus of Sparta are two more examples
of mercenaries who enjoyed high status in their home states. It is interesting to note that
Athenians and Spartans in general had higher standing in Greece as a whole, and were
26

thus often placed in command of mercenary armies.

It is also known that some ofthe

Cyreans brought their own servants with them on the campaign, although Xenophon

23
24
25
26

Diod. Sic. 15.92.2; Benson 2003, p. 494.
Diod. Sic. 16.43.2; Benson 2003, p. 502.
Xen. An. 2.6.1-15. Warriors as upper-class of Sparta: Adkins and Adkins 1997, p. 27.
Trundle 1999, p. 37.
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gives no numbers."^ The men who brought these servants would have had to have paid
28

for them out of their own wages, making them men ofsome means.
As for the status of the unnamed masses of mercenaries, the ancient sources are
biased and contradictory. The most famous example of this bias can be found in the way
different Greeks viewed the Cyreans, Xenophon defended the group by saying,“For
most of the soldiers had sailed away from Greece to undertake this service for pay, not
because their means were scanty, but because they knew by report ofthe noble character
»29

of Cyrus; [...] some had even spent money of their own on the enterprise [...].

Ofthis

same group, the Athenian orator Isocrates would later say in his Panegyric that they were
44

[...] men who, owing to stress of circumstances, were unable to live in their ovm
,-30

cities.

Both of these accounts obviously can not be correct, and neither ofthem is

likely entirely true. Xenophon was trying to defend both himself and the men ofthe
expedition from criticisms, while Isocrates was trying to belittle the Persians by making
light of their opponents. Most historians have chosen Xenophon’s account of his fellow
31

soldiers, although with some reservations.

As stated previously, most of the mercenaries who served the rulers of the East
served as hoplites. In the citizen armies of Greece, status was conferred on the basis of
wealth: men who could not afford to maintain horses but were able to purchase the full
32

hoplite panoply served as heavy infantry.

A Greek warrior would own the most

expensive panoply that he could afford, and considering that that such equipment cost at
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33

least 100 drachmae, it would be a large investment,

If mercenary hoplites had to

provide their own armor, then they would have to have been members of what today
34

would be considered the middle class.

If, however, their arms and armor were provided

by their employers, than mercenaries most likely would have been drawn from the poor
35

of Greek society.

The normal source of a mercenary’s arms and armor is not mentioned anywhere
in the ancient testamonia. Instead, historians have had to extract the information from
circumstantial evidence and from particular instances that are mentioned. Such inductive
reasoning necessarily relies heavily on interpretation, and no consensus has been reached
in the academic world. There are two cases on which the majority ofthe argument for
employers arming their mercenaries rest. The first is the mercenary army gathered by
Dionysius I of Syracuse to protect his tyranny in 405 B.C. In a short span oftime, he
took all the weapons of his citizens and also hired a large mercenary army.^^ P.
McKechnie reasons that the weapons he had taken from the citizens were given to his
mercenary army, and this theory has gone largely unchallenged.^^ In addition to seizing
civilian arms, he later began a massive program of weapon and armor making, which, if
Diodorus Siculus is to believed, turned out some 140,000 shields and 14,000 cuirasses.
38

among other products of war.

This armor was to be distributed to his army of

33

Most expensive: Prittchet 1974, p. 242. Cost: McKechie 1989, p. 81. Prittchet 1974, p. 259 n. 79 gives a
minimum figure of 300 drachmae. Since only a baseline figure is needed here, the smaller amount has
been chosen.
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Bertossa 2003, pp. 361-362. In Athens, for example, most hoplites would have come from the third
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(Bertossa 2003, p. 362 n. 7).
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Roy 2004, pp. 268-269.
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Diod. Sic. 14.10.4.
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McKechnie 1989, p. 82.
Diod. Sic. 14.41, 41.43.2-3; McKechnie 1989, p. 82.
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39

mercenaries and citizens.

The other known instance is another Sicilian tyrant.

Dionysius II. Diodorus Siculus implies that his regime had a centralized and effective
supply system, and so it seems likely that he supplied all his soldiers, both mercenary and
40

citizen, with armor and weapons.
Beyond these two instances, there is little definitive proofto support either
conclusion. There was recently a debate in print, however, between McKechme and
Whitehead. Refuting some circumstantial evidence proffered by McKechnie, Whitehead
41

argued that most mercenaries owned their own armor.

His argument can be broken

down into three main points. The first is "an argument of silence,” which contends that
the ancient historians only mentioned cases where armor was supplied to mercenaries
42

because they were exceptional and worthy of being recorded,

If such was the case, then

the normal procedure would have been for mercenaries to provide their own armor.
Whitehead next argues that the mercenary troops used in mainland Greece were too
diverse in arms and armament to make it practical for their employer to provide them
43

with their equipment.

The final argument addresses the problem of roving bands of

unemployed mercenaries decried by orators such as Isocrates and mentioned by Diodorus
44

Siculus.

Whitehead contends that if these unemployed mercenaries were causing

trouble, then they must have been armed,thus implying that their weapons were their
own.45
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McKechnie begins his refutation of Whitehead by admitting that it is likely that
not all mercenaries would have been supplied by their employer and noting that a
46

mercenary who had his own panoply would have been considered more employable.
Despite this concern, however, he still believes that employers usually supplied the armor
for their mercenaries. He then adds the Phocians (during the Second Sacred War)to his
47

catalog of employers who possibly equipped their mercenaries,

McKechnie dismisses

the “argument from silence'" by saying that many ofthe ancient histories are fragmentary
48

and that the historians had to throw out details for the sake of brevity,

McKechnie

accounts for the roving bands of mercenaries in Greece by noting that some ofthe
mercenaries hired by Phocis escaped before being disarmed, and he argues that similar
49

circumstances might have left bodies of armed, unemployed mercenaries in Greece,

He

also puts forth the theory that armor was given to mercenaries as an incentive and was to
50

be kept by them after they had finished fighting.

The employer would then either write

off the loss or take the money for the cost of the armor from the wages of the
51

mercenary,

Such a system would explain why there were so many former mercenaries

roving armed around Greece.
As shown above, there are instances in the ancient world both of mercenanes
being armed by their employer and having their own arms. Unfortunately, it is unknown
52

which practice was the most common or if perhaps each was equally widespread,
author, however, has found the arguments of Whitehead to be the more convincing.
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The

particularly the one concerning unemployed mercenaries. McKechme’s contention that
mercenary employers provided their men with armor that they then kept is not supported
by any ancient sources and seems largely unsatisfactory. While there likely were those
employers who had the means and the reasons to supply their mercenary troops with
armor, it is doubtful that this was the common practice.
Another question related to the social status of ancient mercenaries concerns
where and when they received their military training. The training of mercenaries is not
53

mentioned anywhere in the ancient sources,even in the case ofthe Cyreans.

Thus it

can be assumed that most mercenaries came into service knowing how to fight. This idea
is bolstered when one considers the number of tasks that mercenaries were called upon to
54

do, including raiding, garrisoning, participating in set-piece battles, and others.
Experience and training in such matters would have most likely come from service or at
55

least training in the citizen armies of their home cities,

Moreover, mercenaries were

hired for more or less immediate service and it appears unlikely that an employer would
want to take the time to make sure that his mercenaries were trained. Finally,
mercenaries were often hired because of their discipline and professionalism, both of
56

which would have required training and experience,

It is probably that these two

virtues would have been gained by training with the citizen army ofa Greek

rather

than after having taken up mercenary service.
The main source for information about the age of mercenaries is the Anabasis.
Xenophon reveals much about the soldiers alongside whom he fought, information which
53

Roy 2004, p. 270.
Roy 2004, p. 271.
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the modem historian is glad to have. The Cyreans were widely varied in age: the
youngest member attested is a trumpeter of 18(who most likely would have been 16
when he joined the mercenary army), while there were a number of mercenaries over the
57

age of 45.

This age range fits into the known pattern of Greek society, in which men

between the ages of 18 and 60 served as soldiers.^^ It is interesting to note that all the
common soldiers in the army were paid the same, despite the fact that the younger men
59

(those under 30) were considered more agile and were often given the tougher duties.
The proportion of younger to older men is never provided, but there is some evidence to
indicate that the latter may have been few in number. When the Cyreans marched from
Trapezus to Cerasus, the men over forty were allowed to sail on the ships along with the
60

women, children, and sick.

Xenophon does not give the number of ships that the

mercenaries had at their disposal, but considering that they had to ask for ships from the
city of Trapezus, which they then used to capture merchant vessels, it seems unlikely that
61

they would have had very many,

Furthermore, on one occasion these soldiers were left

behind to guard the camp of the Cyreans, and their number was apparently the minimum
acceptable for such a task.^^ Thus perhaps the army consisted predominately of younger
63

men, at least in the lower ranks.
from 30 to 55 years.

64

The original generals ofthe Cyreans ranged in age

Similarly, Agesilaus was 41 when he served as a mercenary

captain for Ariobarzanes and 83 when he fought in Egypt for Tachos and Nectenebo.
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The most common probable age for mercenary service can be deduced from the
above range when one combines the idea of training and self-equipment with what is
known about the Greek lifecycle. It is known that in Athens, military training was
compulsory for young men. The young men undergoing such training were known as
ephebes and their training began at age 18 and lasted for two years.^^ A similar system
was in place in Sparta and likely throughout all of Greece.^^ After one year of this
training, the ephebes were eligible for military service, and the 19 to 29 year olds were
doubtless called more frequently for military service than any others.^^ Once a man
reached age 30, he was considered to be a full citizen in both Athens and Sparta.

A

young man in Athens could be married sometime between the ages of 17 and 35,
69

although most may have been married while they were between 25 and 30 years old.
Based on this information, it seems reasonable that the most common period of
mercenary service would occur in the grey years after military training but before
government service. This conclusion is supported by evidence from a passage from the
Anabasis where Xenophon writes of the Cyreans that “[...] another class had abandoned
fathers and mothers.

70

This statement implies young men past the age of military

training who still lived with their parents and were thus unmamed.^^ At least some of the
men were married, however,for the very next section ofthe passage mentions men who
«72

had “left children behind with the idea of getting money to bring back to them,

Thus it

seems that there were both married and unmarried mercenaries, although it is doubtful.
65
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however, that many mercenaries, especially career ones, would have been mamed at the
time of their serv ice.
From the evidence, it appears that mercenary service appealed to a wide range of
Greeks, with men of all backgrounds, social statuses, and ages being willing to hire out
their spears. There was, however a certain “average” Greek mercenary, at least in the
fourth century. This mercenary was young (under 45 years ofage, and more likely
between 20-30 years old), from mainland Greece(most likely either from the
Peloponnesus or from Athens), and of hoplite status. This mercenary would have most
likely owned his own panoply and served in or at least trained with the citizen army of
his city as a heavy infantryman.
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V
The Motivations of Mercenaries

Ha\ ing deleimined the kind of men who took up Greek mercenary service, it is
now time to examine their possible motives. This task presents immediate difficulties by
its ver>' nature. Any attempt to determine the motives of any one person and especially
any one group in retrospect is a difficult and necessarily speculative task. In the case of
the motivations of Greek mercenaries in the time period in question, this task is
impossible, for there is no single reason that could explain why so many men took up
mercenary service. The primary factor that renders the task unfeasible is the size and
diversity of the group in question. In the fourth century B.C. alone, as we have seen,
there were, on average, some 25,000 to 50,000 Greeks serving as mercenaries somewhere
in the w'orld.* As shown in the previous chapter, these men came from all over the Greek
world. Such a diverse group would have contained a wide range of backgrounds, beliefs,
and objectives. Also, some men came to mercenary service as foot soldiers, some

as

captains (lochagoi), and some as generals (strategoi), and each one ofthese ranks could
reasonably expect something different from their service. Each man had his own reasons
for being there, and his were likely different from those ofthe man standing next to him.
Although certain common causes for taking up mercenary service might be postulated,
there is no singular answer to the question. In the place of a singular approach, several
different possible motives will be presented here which may have informed the decisions
of Greek men to hire out their spears.

'Parke 1933, p. 227. Trundle 2004, pp. 44-48 gives no total but does support the idea of a massive surge in
hiring and gives examples of large scale hiring.
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This pluralistic approach has its difficulties as well, the first being that many of
the possible motivations are intertwined, thus making it difficult to separate them. For
instance, a mercenary' who served on behalf of his state might still expect to be
remunerated for his efforts, or a mercenary general may have agreed to lead an armed
force both in hopes of securing money and in order to gain the fnendship ofthe
employer. Because of this mixing of motives, it is necessary to devise a system, which
while being artificial, allows the motives to be presented in an organized fashion. For the
purposes of this chapter, the motives have been divided into the categories of“external
and “internal." External motivations are those whose causes were beyond the control of
the mercenary and include such things as exile, poverty, and state-sponsored mercenary
service. Internal motivations are best thought of as those things which a mercenary might
be actively pursuing, such as wealth, power, and xenos (friendship). The reader should
bear in mind that this distinction is entirely artificial and that many motives from both
categories might contribute to a mercenary’s decision to take up the trade.
There is one final difficulty in determining the possible motivations of a Greek
mercenary, and that is a lack of evidence. With one obvious exception, there are no
surviving accounts of mercenaries recording their motivations for hiring themselves out
as soldiers. There is also the same problem of biased sources encountered in the previous
chapter, especially since many ofthe same sources and even same passages are employed
here as well. Finally, there are few sources that directly concern the mercenaries serving
in the East, requiring the use in many places of sources that deal with the hiring and
payment of mercenaries within Greece itself

71

The external motivations will be dealt with first. Perhaps the most common and
previously accepted argument was that mercenaries were compelled to service by
poverty. This belief was common among the Athenian orators and other contemporary
observers. The fourth-century orator Isocrates was perhaps the most vocal proponent of
this explanation. In his Panegyric, he observes of the Greeks that “many,compelled
through lack of the necessities of life to enlist in foreign armies, are being slain, fighting
for their foes against their friends.’"' In a letter to Philip II of Macedon, Isocrates notes
that those who had fought against the Persian king under Cyrus had been able to “rise
from obscurity to brilliant distinction, from poverty to wealth, and from low estate to be
masters of many lands and cities.”^ Later in the same letter, he says of mercenaries in
Greece that “If we do not stop these men from banding together, by providing sufficient
livelihood for them, they will grow before we know it into so great a multitude as to be a
terror no less to the Hellenes than to the barbarians.

In the same passage, Isocrates

claims that a campaign against Persia would serve to “deliver these homeless wanderers
from the ills [i.e. poverty] by which they are afflicted and which they inflict upon
others.

Isocrates* fellow orator Demosthenes also believed that mercenary service was

motivated by poverty, for he said, concerning the potential hiring power ofthe Persian
king.
For although I believe that many Greeks would consent to serve in his pay
against the Egyptians and Orontes and other barbarians, not so much to
enable him to subdue any ofthose enemies as to win for themselves

^Isoc. 4.168.
^ Isoc. 5.89. This quote is similar in purpose and content to Isoc. 4.146, which was discussed above, p. 59.
Isoc. 5.121.
Isoc. 5.122.
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L

wealth and relief from their present poverty, yet I do not think that any
Greek would attack Greece.^
The idea that poverty was the primary motive behind mercenary service has also
been picked up by modem historians. Perhaps the best articulated argument of poverty as
a motivation comes from Parke, who bases much of his information on the words of the
orators. Parke's arguments have been followed by many later scholars who have
accepted his conclusions and built other arguments upon them, thus making his ideas
worth examining here. In his treatment of the subject, Parke admits that there is little
evidence of what the economic conditions were in fift h and fourth-century B.C. Greece.^
He thus assumes that there was no overall economic decline and instead focuses on
agricultural depression, which historians of his time believed was a fact of life in fourthcentury Greece due to the ravages of war.^ The damaged land became all but worthless
except to those with the money to restore it, meaning that peasant farms were subsumed
into larger farms owned by wealthier men.^ This forced the small farmers off their land
and into new occupations. Wage labor and work indoors would have unacceptable to
some of these men for social reasons, while other ventures would have been closed due to
a lack of capital.

10

Work in a job requiring unskilled labor would have difficult to get

because of the number of slaves practicing such trades, and most peasants would not have
II

had the training and abilities necessary for skilled labor.

^ Dem. 14.31.
"Parke 1933, p. 229.
® Parke 1933, p. 229.
Parke 1933, p. 230.
Parke 1933, p. 231.
"Parke 1933, p. 231.
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Mercenary service, on the

other hand, would have been relatively simple for the men who had once formed “the
.,12

backbone of the citizen army.

Most of Parke's information on agricultural decline comes from Attica, a fact
13

which he admits.

He does, however, note events in Athens that could be considered a

part of the same overall trend. The Agrarian party in that city, for instance, ceased to be a
force in politics in the fourth century, perhaps due to lack of a support base of small
14

farmers.

Parke also mentions the fact that the number of citizens at hoplite status had

not decreased between 410 and 322 B.C, but dismisses this as a result of population
increase and falling worth of money, both of which could serve to absorb the loss of
15

peasant hoplites who lost their farms to the war.
Parke supports his theory by next arguing that the wages paid to mercenaries were
so low as to only appeal to those who had no other means ofkeeping themselves alive.
He bases his argument on the figures provided by Demosthenes in his First Philippic. In
this speech, Demosthenes is outlining to his fellow Athenians his ideas for an army to
fight against Philip II of Macedon in 350-349 B.C. This army was to employ
16

mercenaries at the rate of two obols a day.

Parke does note that Demosthenes was

trying to be as economical as possible in his scheme and that it was never put into
17

effect.

Parke believes that the rate of pay is accurate, nonetheless, even though it would
18

have provided enough for only a subsistence wage by his own estimates.

The fact that

Demosthenes thought he could find men to serve for two obols a day indicates the

Parke 1933, p. 230.
Parke 1933, p. 230.
14
Parke
1933, p. 230.
15
Parke
1933,
p. 230.
16
Dem. 4.20.
17
Parke 1933, p. 232.
18
Parke 1933, p. 232.
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19

poverty that potential mercenaries must have been trying to escape,

Moving on to the

close of the fourth century, Parke contends that although the pay of mercenaries had
doubled to four obols a day, this raise reflected no actual increase in spending power
because of the rise in cost of living that occurred with the influx ofPersian gold caused
by Alexander the Great's invasion.”® He compares this price to the three obols a day
being given to unwaged slave labor in Greece at the same time to show how little
mercenary hoplites were actually making.”* From this evidence, Parke concludes that
“[...] the general rate of pay for more than half the fourth century is too low to leave any
room for doubt that the profession was unremunerative, and had mostly been adopted for
want of a better."””
I'here are problems, however, with Parke’s argument. A further reading ofthe
First Philipic finds that the two obols a day that Demosthenes proposed to give to the
mercenaries (and to the native Athenian infantry) were intended only as money for “the
23

bare rationing" of the infantry,

Demosthenes acknowledged the fact that this “ration

money” might seem to some to be “a small provision” but he was confident that the
remainder of the soldiers’ pay could be made up “out ofthe war,” by looting and
24

raiding.

To be fair, Parke does note this fact, but he merely states it and does not draw

any conclusions from it other than that it serves to explain the destruction that usually
25

followed in the wake of mercenary troops,

The mercenaries that would have been

employed under this plan would have thus not really been working for two obols a day

19

Parke 1933, p. 232.
Parke 1933, p. 233.
21
Parke 1933, p. 233
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Dem. 4.28; Pritchett 1991, p. 380; Loomis 1998, p. 52.
24
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but rather for whatever money they could have made from plunder while their expenses
w^ere taken care of by the wage. Coupled with the fact that it was intended to provide
Athens with a cheap army that would not burden the already strained finances ofthe city,
it seems that the plan of Demosthenes outlined in the First Philipic does not provide a
truly accurate testament to the pay of mercenaries and regular soldiers for the time.
The debate surrounding the interpretation of Demosthenes brings up an issue that
must be clarified before the discussion of mercenary pay can continue. As noted above,
mercenaries received more than one kind of pay, and it is often difficult for the historian
to distinguish between the types, especially as the Greeks themselves did not until the
26

great mercenary armies of the fourth century made such distinctions necessary.
Furthermore, mercenaries were not always paid in coin, but sometimes in land, grain, or
27

even the promise of the above.

The system ofterms that eventually developed in the

writings of Thucydides and later Greek historians and writers for describing the
mercenaries’ remuneration was as given below, and the Greek terms will be used
henceforth where possible in the discussion of mercenary motivations. It should also be
noted that these terms were not just used of mercenaries but also in discussion of military
pay of any kind during the time period. Misthos was the actual wage or salary of a
mercenary that was given to him for his services, and is the basic term for pay in general
in the Greek world. Trophe was food that was given to the mercenaries in an edible
form, as distinguished from siteresion^ which was money provided for the purchasing of
28

food. Siios was grain, and ephodia was money to cover the expenses of travel,

Despite

their seemingly well-defined meanings, these terms were not always used consistently for
Trundle 2004, p. 84.
Trundle 2004, p. 84.
Trundle 2004, p. 84.
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the same purposes, and there is some debate as to whether or not the Greeks truely used
the words in any systematic sense."^ This lack of consistency means that it is often
difficult to tell from the word used in a source the purpose for which the pay in question
30

was actually intended.

In addition to the misunderstandings stemming from the differing kinds of pay.
there are other problems with Parke’s argument. The deflation of mercenary wages in the
middle of the fourth century was unlikely as severe as Parke made it out to be according
31

to his reading of Demosthenes,

Also, there is evidence that the presumed increase in

the cost of living in the latter half of the century (after the invasion of Alexander the
Great) did not in fact occur. A play of Menander provides proof that it was possible to
live, albeit poorly, on two obols a day even at the end ofthe fourth century.^^ Thus,four
obols a day would provide more than enough pay on which to live. A further problem
with the poverty argument is the fact that the Peloponnesus,from which the largest
number of mercenaries came in the fourth century, was in large part untouched by the
33

Peloponnesian War.

Also, as has already been shown, mercenary service existed long

34

before that war.

Finally, in perspective, Greece was no poorer than any ofthe other

areas of the Aegean, and yet one does not see the same massive surge in mercenary
35

employment from those regions.
Despite these problems, Parke’s argument is still relevant. Although mercenary
service may not have been as poorly rewarded as he would have his readers believe, that
29

Trundle 2004, p. 84.
For a fuller debate and specific instances of usages by various ancient authors, see Trundle 2004, pp. 8490.
31
Parke 1933, p. 232; McKechnie 1989, p. 89.
32
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p. 58.
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Trundle 2004, p. 58.
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does not mean that some men were not driven to it by poverty. Although it is highly
unlikely that displaced small farmers can completely explain the surge in mercenaries
available for hire, it could explain perhaps a small number ofthe “first generation” of
mercenaries. Furthermore, the men affected by the devastation ofthe Peloponnesian War
in the way Parke describes would be the perfect candidates for mercenary service:
citizen-soldiers with training and/or experience in their state’s army and likely their own
panoply purchased before they were driven into poverty. Thus, poverty must be
considered as a possible motivation for some ofthe men who undertook mercenary
service.
Another possible external motivation was exile. Exile in Greece was defined as
36

the permanent or at least long term removal of one from his home city,

The reasons for

exile were numerous, and might include the commission ofa crime or the failure to
perform a duty. Political exiles were usually people suspected of plotting against the
37

government, although other charges are attested to as well,

Belonging to a polis was

considered by the ancient Greeks to be an indispensable part of life, and people from
38

outside a city were viewed with suspicion,

In addition to this suspicion, exile also

entailed a loss of privilege and status in the home city and limited the possibilities for
39

employment.

Mercenary service was one ofthe few ways to earn a wage outside of the
40

polis and it is thus not surprising that many mercenaries were known exiles.
Furthermore, the fourth century was a time of political upheaval in Greece, and this
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OCD^, p. 58 s.v. exile (E.S. Stavely and A. W. Linton).
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41

turmoil increased greatly the number of exiles.

It is known,for instance, that in 324

B.C.. over 20.000 exiles gathered at Olympia to hear a messenger of Alexander announce
they could return home."^" Not all of these exiles became mercenaries, however, and the
number of exiles does not match the number of mercenaries employed in the fourth
43

century.

Many of the exiles who did take up mercenary service did so as a means of
44

Such was the case ofthe Milesans who

regaining admission into their home cities,

45

fought for Cyrus upon the promise that he would return them to their city,

Exiles were

common in the armies of the Persian satraps, and many ofthe mercenaries that Alexander
46

faced were exiles from Greek city-states.
One of the more interesting external motivations is state-sponsored mercenary
service. In these instances, a state would send out a leader or group of soldiers for the
purpose of engaging in mercenary activities. It is unknown from the sources whether the
men sent out under such terms had a choice in the matter or not. Despite this ambiguity.
this phenomenon has been categorized as an external motivation because the terms of
service seem to have been negotiated by the states involved, rather than by the
individuals. In any event, the two primary motivations for a state sending out its own
citizens as mercenaries seem to be to raise money and to appease a foreign power. The
Spartan king Agesilaus performed such a service to his state for the former reason on at
least two occasions: when he led a force for Ariobarzanes and when he brought his own
47

people to serve as mercenaries for Tachos.

His actions set the pattern for future Spartan

41
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kings, who would continue to loan out themselves and their countrymen to raise money
48

for their own mercenaries.

The Athenian Iphicrates served the Persians in the first

aborted invasion of Egypt in 374 because the satrap Phamabazus requested him, and the
49

Athenians agreed to send him in order to appease the Persians,

Similarly, the city also

sent out Timotheus in 366 to aid Ariobarzanes in capturing the island of Samos, which
50

was being held by a rival Greek mercenary captain and his troops, for the same reason.
The external motivations for mercenary service are many and varied. Poverty
may have been a reason for some mercenaries to take up this service, although one must
be careful in assigning this motive to the majority of mercenaries. Exile would have
limited the options of a man and perhaps driven him to mercenary service for lack of
better opportunities or in the hope of getting readmitted to his home city. State sponsored
mercenary activity can also account for a small number of mercenaries and mercenary
leaders that were employed in the East.
The most obvious of the possible internal motivations is money, since it formed
the basic relationship between the mercenary soldier and his employer. Such a simplistic
analysis of the situation, however, might very well be in error. Personal financial gain is
mentioned as a motivation in the ancient sources, but not as much as one might be led to
51

think by the definition of mercenary service provided above,

Despite its poor showing

in the sources, however, financial gain would have been an important part of any decision
to embark on mercenary service and so must be discussed here.
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Because of the confusion in terms and the lack of direct information, it is difficult
to calculate the wages of mercenaries, especially over a period as broad as the one in
question. One way of tr> ing to deduce how much mercenary soldiers made is to examine
the pay given to citizen soldiers in Greece. This approach of course relies on the
assumption that mercenaries in the service ofthe Greek city-states were paid the same as
citizen-soldiers. Not all historians have agreed on this assumption, but the weight of
52

modem opinion is on the side of comparable pay.

There is no actual evidence to the

contrary, and the conclusion is supported by a passage in Thucydides which does reveal
53

equal pay on at least one occasion.

Based on evidence from Thucydides, it would seem that during the Pelopoimesian
War(431 -404 B.C.), the common rate for soldiers and sailors in Athenian pay was one
drachma (6 obols) a day.**^ In 412, following the failed Sicilian campaign,the wages fell
55

to three obols a day.

For the period immediately after the war,the figures are difficult

to detemiine, but evidence from the closing years ofthe century points to a wage offour
56

obols a day for those in Athenian service.
Non-Athenian evidence follows the same general trend shown above. In 420
B.C., Thucydides records a treaty between Athens and three other city states which
provides for foot soldiers (including hoplites) sent to the relief of a city to be paid three

52

" For opposition to the idea, see Griffith 1935, pp. 294-297.
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Aiginelan obols (ca. 4.325 Attic obols)silos per day after thirty days.^^ The purpose of
this money is unclear, given the supposed meaning ofsitos, but with the average wage for
troops at the time being one drachma per day, it seems likely to the author the money was
intended for siteresion. ephodia, or some combination ofthe two, rather than as total
58

pay.

The soldiers in question would have been citizen soldiers and thus would have

received their misthos from their home city. The money paid after thirty days would
merely go toward offsetting the cost of keeping these troops fed away from home for
such a prolonged period of time. Any other interpretation ofthe treaty would mean that
that after a certain point, the help of an ally would have to be purchased just like that of
mercenaries. Such an expectation would make for an alliance of questionable worth.
In 412 B.C., the Persian satrap Tissaphemes paid the crews ofthe ships under his
command one drachma per day, but, for the future,“resolved not to give more than three
obols, until he had consulted the king; when if the king should so order he would give, he
-59

said, the full drachma.

Upon protest, however, he did agree to pay more than this
60

amount, although the final figure is not given,

Whatever the final rate was, it was
61

reduced the next year to three obols a day for the sailors on the advice of Alcibiades.
Finally, in 408, the satrap Cyrus agreed to raise the wage ofthe sailors in the
62

Peloponnesian fleet from three obols to four per day.
The wages of the fourth-century soldier in Greece are much harder to determine
than those of the fifth because of the scarcity of sources and the fact that it was around
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this time that terms for various aspects of pay began to be used, thus making it difficult to
determine o\ erall pay.^^ Loomis concludes that the standard minimum rate for those in
Athenian ser\ ice was four obols misthos and two obols siteresion for a total ofone
64

drachma a day.

He notes that this sum is a minimum,and on at least two recorded
65

occasions w as supplemented generously by additional misthos or siteresion.

Trundle

adds that during the Sacred Wars, the mercenaries hired by the Phocians could have
66

received anywhere from four obols to two drachmae a day.
The wages paid to the mercenaries in the East are easier to reconstruct, especially
in the case of the Cyreans. In almost all cases, they were higher than those available back
in Greece, a fact due in large part to the wealth of the region. Xenophon notes that at the
67

start of the campaign, the mercenaries were offered one Persian daric a month misthos.
This amount was later increased to a daric and a half a month at the request ofthe
68

soldiers.

In 400 B.C., after the death of Cyrus, Timasion the Dardanian offered the

remainder of the Cyreans one Cyzicene (about 25 drachmas)^^per month to take them to
70

Troas.

The next year, the Cyreans were again offered misthos ofone Cyzicene per

soldier per month by Seuthes, although with the addition that each captain would receive
71

two and each general four per month.

Seuthes later mentioned that the above
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72

arrangement was "customary pay'’ for mercenaries,

This statement is bom out by the

fact that the next year, Thibron offered money in the same ratio, this time one daric a
73

month for regular soldiers, two for captains, and four for generals.
The interpretation of the wages of mercenaries also presents its own problems.
There seems to be little stability in the amount of base wages. Many theories have been
advanced to account for the lack of consistency, but perhaps the most suitable one is that
provided by Trundle, who notes that mercenary pay was tied to what citizen soldiers of a
given state could expect to be paid (with the exception ofthe Eastern kings) and the
74

needs of the employer.

The greater the need ofthe employer,the more the mercenaries

could demand of him, as shown by the repeated renegotiations ofthe Cyreans with C)tus.
Of course, there w ere limitations to how much the employer could or would be willing to
pay, as shown by the drastic decreases in the wages paid to Athenian soldiers after the
expensive disaster at Syracuse. Trundle also notes that a mercenary’s pay depended on
status within an anny, and also on success. Success would bring additional money in the
75

form of plunder and/or bonuses, while rank would determine base pay.
To summarize the evidence, it seems that the pay for a mercenary in the service of
a Greek city state ranged from between one drachma a day during the majority ofthe
Peloponnesian War and the fourth century to two obols a day siteresion and hope of
76

plunder in Demosthenes’ plan of 351 B.C.

Those serving the Persians in the same span

of time could expect to make between three and seven and a half obols a day. To put
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these figures into perspective, the range of wages for skilled and unskilled laborers during
the same time ranged from three obols to two drachmae a day.^^ It should be noted.
howe\ er, that a laborer was not always paid according to time but by the finished
7X

product.

Also, a wage laborer would not necessarily be paid every day, but rather when
79

the product was completed.

Thus, it seems that the men who took part in mercenary

service may not hav e been as desperate as some have sought to prove.
I'his is not to say however, that, mercenary service was a particularly
remunerative occupation, or at least not if one looks only at wages. Even the five to
seven and half obols a day paid to the Cyreans was not as much as first appears, given
80

that it was a total wage from which the cost offood was subtracted,

Given that two

obols a day seems to be the minimum for food, the actual net pay ofa mercenary would
81

have thus been considerably reduced,

Also, mercenary wages, no matter how good,

were typically not enough to allow a man to save up for the future.*’ Furthermore, there
was no guarantee that a mercenary would ever see his daily wages, since employers often
83

withheld pay as a way of securing their men to themselves,

Trundle argues

persuasively that wages were little more than a way to keep alive until the mercenaries
84

were in a position to obtain money in more lucrative maimers.
Fortunately for the mercenary, his wages were not the only money that he could
expect to receive and may have indeed been the smallest part of his remuneration. Less
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would bave come

from bonuses, awards,

regular but possibh' iar larger sums of mone)
and booiv. Ofihc three, booty potentially

had the largest payoffand ^vas perhaps the

ice.^^ Such an interest in plunder
single stromzest linancial incentive of mercena^ ser\ice
&6

For a

was not inereh' the concern of mercenaries, but also citizen-soldiers as \\ell.
87

mercenary. howe\ er. it represented the shortest

and most lucrative path to wealth.

The

few men w ho became wealthy as a result ot mercenary service, such as tb
8S

Xenophon and Nicostratus. did so on the profits of plunder,

Booty came in a variety of

,the estates of wealthy
ibrms and from a \ ariety of places. Cities, enemy camps
individuals, and even sanctuaries were all places from
8^;

be taken.

Objects of plunder included the armor

which considerable plunder could

of enemies, stored food (especially
m

grain), livestock, people to be sold as slaves- objects of gold and/or silver, and money
the form of coins.

DO

In short- anything that could be carried off by an army was

considered fit for plunder. Plunder in mercenary aimies(and indeed, armies in gener )
91

was considered the property of the general, who then redistributed it as he saw fit.
Indeed, the standing order among the Cyreans when they were
92

plunder w'ent to a common store for all the men.

on the march was that all

Once the men were encamped,
93

however, they could keep for themselves whatever they found.
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How much a mercenary made from plunder depended on a variety offactors,
including success in battle, the wealth ofthe region in which he was operating, and the
wishes of the employer. On the march to Susa, for instance, Cyrus the Younger did not
let his army plunder those regions he considered to be friendly, leaving them only the
94

province of Lycaonia to ravage.

On the way back to and in Asia Minor, however,the

95

mercenary anny plundered often.

Some of this plundering was done for survival, but

96

most was for profit.

At one point, while the mercenary army was stationary for an

extended duration while w'aiting for ships, the soldiers were able to make off with large
amounts of foodstuffs, wine, figs, and sheep from the rich country in which they were
97

encamped.

1 he last recorded event in the Anabasis is a raid conducted on two

consecutive nights by Xenophon and about 600 men against the wealthy Persian
98

Asidates, which netted the group cattle, sheep, and 200 slaves.

When Idrieus, tyrant of

Caria, sailed to subdue Cyprus upon the request of Artaxerxes II in 344 B.C., some 8,000
mercenaries serving in Syria and Cilicia volunteered to join the expedition in hopes of
plundering the island.

Often in mercenary armies, plunder was actually converted into
100

pay by the employers.

Cyrus and Seuthes both utilized this strategy to pay the

Cyreans, and Demosthenes’ plan in the First Philipic can be considered as following the
101

same model.
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Bonuses and awards were the other possible sources ofincome. Bonuses were
102

one-time gifts given by the employer to the mercenaries for various reasons,

Awards

could be authorized by either the employer or by a general, and they were usually paid to
103

soldiers demonstrating unusual bravery and/or fitness,

The primary evidence for the

existence of bonuses and awards comes from ihQ Anabasis. The mercenaries who served
Cyrus as a bodyguard when he went to his father’s court in 405 B.C. received a bonus for
104

For the most part, however, the largess

their services, although the amount is unstated,

of Cyrus seemed limited to his officers (the captains and generals), each of whom he
105

promised before Cunaxa a bonus of a gold crown,

Menon,for inspiring his soldiers to

cross the Euphrates River while the rest ofthe mercenaries were debating their plan of
106

action, received an award of unknown amount from Cyrus, while his men did not.
Cyrus did not promise a bonus to the common soldiers until it was demanded of him after
107

he revealed his plan to attack the Persian king,

In order to get the troops to proceed, he

had to promise to give each man a bonus of5 minae silver once they reached Babylon
108

and to pay their wages for the return to Ionia.

The Egyptians also gave their Greek

mercenaries a bonus on at least one occasion, when Nectenebo I gave Agesilaus 230
109

talents of silver for his part in helping him secure the Egyptian throne in 360 B.C.

This

payment can be considered a bonus because Tachos,the Pharaoh who actually hired him,
110

had given Agesilaus money in advance with which to hire mercenanes.
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A more intangible but equally important motivation for mercenary soldiers might
have been glory. Manliness {andreid) was a key aspect in the Uiad^ and thus become a
III

virtue in all Greek societies.

Great honor was given to men who performed well in
112

combat, and distinguishing oneself in battle was important even in mercenary armies.
A common soldier could win a great name for himself, even while serving as a
mercenary, by performing heroic deeds in battle. Xenophon praised the mercenaries with
113

whom he serv ed, both common men and officers.

The rewards for distinguished

service were even greater for a mercenary officer. Success in war could bring with it
political pow er back home and might even allow one to render better services to his home
State.

1 14

A commander with a good reputation could also attract better troops to him as
115

well as potential employers.

Xenos. or friendship, is another ofthe possible incentives for mercenary service,
although perhaps one limited for the most part to the upper ranks of mercenary armies.
Motivation by xenos would include both mercenary service undertaken out offiiendship
for the employer (although without state sanction and with the expectation of pay)or out
of hope of such a reciprocal relationship. This relationship may have been desired for
either personal gain or because the mercenary respected certain qualities ofthe
1 16

employer.

According to Xenophon,this was the primary motivation ofthe Cyreans:

For most of the soldiers had sailed away from Greece to undertake this service for pay
117

[...] because they knew by report of the noble character of Cyrus.

]11

Such an evaluation

Trundle 2004, p. 67.
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2004, p. 67. Trundle vaguely cites speeches of Isaeus that confirm this point.
I 1.^
Praise for officers: Xen. An. 2.6.30. Praise for common soldiers: Xen. An. 4.7.12. Trundle 2004, p. 67.
I 14
Trundle 2004, pp. 67-68 gives the example of Conon the Athenian.
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Trundle 2004, pp. 67-68.
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is likelN' propaganda, for it is doubtful that all ofthe mercenaries, especially the common
soldiers, would have had either the opportunity or the desire to form a friendship with
Cyrus. It is known, however, that the generals of the army were the ritual guest-friends
118

{xenoi) of C\ rus, so xenos was a motivation for at least the upper ranks,

Xenophon

himself went as a xenos of Proxenus, one ofthe generals, and hoped to become xenos of
1 19

Cyrus.

Such relationships were both common in mercenary service and an important
120

part of the recruitment process of mercenaries and mercenary leaders.
Another motivation that would primarily appeal to mercenary officers is the
121

potential for command and power that might not be available in their home cities.
Perhaps the best example of a mercenary commander realizing great personal gain in this
122

respect is Memnon of Rliodes.

Little is known about Memnon before his appearance

as the leader of 4.000 mercenaries in the service of Egypt, but by the time of his death in
333 B.C., he had become a member ofthe ruling class of Persia, in addition to being one
123

of the most trusted generals of the Persian king,

He also owned land in the Troad and
124

was married to the sister of the Persian satrap Artabazus.

Memnon is not the only

example of mercenary generals and captain gaining power and command in the service of
foreign powers. The Spartan Clearachus is another example. When the expedition he
was leading to Thrace was cancelled and he was sentenced to death upon his refusal to
return, he took service with Cyrus, who gave him money to continue his fight against the
I 18

Trundle 2004, p. 43.
Xen. An. 3.1.4; Trundle 2004, pp. 43, 105.
120
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121
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Thracians before he placed him in command ofthe Cyreans.

Both ofthese

assignments were better than any he was likely to have obtained if he had remained in the
sole service of Sparta.
I'he internal motivations of a mercenary were varied but centered on personal
gain. The wages of a mercenary would have provided at least a means ofliving on the
campaign, while plunder, bonuses, and awards would have been much more lucrative and
more desirable. Mercenary service would have given both common men and officers the
chance to show their manliness and earn glory for themselves on the battlefield. For the
officers of mercenary armies, who already had money,going on a campaign gave them a
chance to fonn a guest-friend relationship with their employer. Such a relationship could
have many potential benefits, in terms of both increased status and wealth. Power was
also another potential motivation for mercenary officers, since many generals wielded
more power as mercenaries than they had in their native cities and were able to achieve
greater status both abroad and at home by hiring themselves out.

125
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VI
Service in the East

Ha\ ing examined both why mercenaries were employed in the East and what
motivated mercenary service, there remains but one ancillary question that will tie
together the two main issues. This question is why Greek mercenaries themselves would
choose to ser\ e in the East. The answer has been hinted at throughout this work, but it
would be appropriate now to address the issue fully.
As staled in the introduction, the mercenary hoplite had little opportunity of
consistent employment within Greece. Most Greek city states preferred to hire peltasts,
since they already had their own native hoplites. A casual glance at the numbers gathered
by Parke in his work might seem to contradict this conclusion, but carefully examining
the numbers and placing them in context will reveal the truth.^ Although the Greeks did
hire seemingly large numbers of mercenaries, their level of utilization was much lower
than that of the Eastern monarchs. In many cases, it is unknown how many ofthe
mercenaries hired by the Greek states were hoplites, peltasts, or other kinds oftroops.
The numbers of known hoplites show that they were hired in fairly small numbers and for
short durations by the Greek states. Indeed, according to Parke’s figures, only on four
occasions were armies of more than 5,000 Greek mercenaries hired by Greek states, and
at least 15,000 of these mercenaries actually served in Asia rather than in Greece. In the
same time span, the Persians and Egyptians hired nine such large bodies of mercenaries

‘ Parke 1933, Table II.
’Parke 1933, Table II.
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for \ arious campaigns and duties.^ Also, in Persian and Egyptian service, mercenaries
would ha\ e had the opportunity to serve for extended durations, performing such
relatively leisurely duties as garrisoning and serving as bodyguards. The hoplite
mercenaries hired by the Greek states, on the other hand, were usually hired for single
campaigns or other limited duties.
I'he primary reason for such limited employment on the Greek mainland is simple
but important. The Greek states possessed sufficient numbers of native hoplite infantry
tor most duties. Indeed, most of the mercenaries who fought for the Greek city states
were peltasts. Fighting in such a manner required a high degree of skill and
professionalism that was often more easily bought than trained."* There were generally
only two circumstances which would require the large-scale hiring of hoplite mercenaries
by Greek city-states. The first is when special circumstances necessitated the raising of
larger numbers of troops than a city could provide, as during the Sacred Wars and the
various campaigns against Philip of Macedon. The second circumstance is when citystates needed soldiers that could be away from Greece for extended periods. The 5,000
Cyreans hired by the Spartan Thibron belong in this category, since they spent their time
campaigning in the East.
There were secondary reasons for the limited hiring of mercenaries by the Greek
states as well. Perhaps the most important ofthese causes was the relative poverty of
most of the Greek states following the near-constant wars that had been raging in the fifth
and fourth centuries. Most of the city-states could only afford to hire mercenaries by
adopting extreme measures, such as using their native hoplites as mercenaries, as Sparta

^ Parke 1933, Table 11.
Trundle 2004, p. 40.
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did. taking money from the Persian king, or plundering other regions, such as the
Phocians at Delphi. The only Greek state which possessed sufficient funds for the hiring
of mercenaries throughout the fourth century was Sicilian Syracuse. The tyrants
Dionysius 1 and Dionysius II both hired large numbers of mercenary hoplites throughout
their respecti\ e reigns.'^ The relative numbers of mercenaries they hired still falls short of
those hired b> Persians and Egyptians, however.
It is easy to see why so many Greek mercenaries went to the East in order to
ser\'e. In the East, there was an almost insatiable demand for manpower caused by the
rise and fall of major empires and the constant fighting over the same land. Coupled with
the lack of quality native heavy infantry, this continual warfare created a ready market for
hoplite mercenaries. Moreover, the kingdoms ofthe East were wealthy and able to
reward richly their mercenaries, far more so than were the Greek states.

● Parke. 1933, Table II.
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Conclusion

It was during a class on Greeks in Egypt that I was first seriously introduced to
the mercenary and the importance that he could play in a foreign society. As a parade of
mercenaries marched across time in that desert kingdom, I began to think about the men
themselves: their dreams, their aspirations, and what they sought to gain from hiring out
their spears. This thesis is a direct outgrowth ofthat curiosity and the research to which it
led me. If I have accomplished my goal, you, the reader, should have by now gained
insight into the invasiveness and importance of Greek mercenaries in the East and into
what may have caused these men to take up that service.
In concluding, it is important to place the mercenary into his proper context.
Hired soldiers were certainly not the only ones fighting and dying in the Archaic and
Classical ages, and when they took the field, they were almost always accompanied by
native troops. What, then, makes the mercenary so special and so unique? What has
made him capture the minds of scholars and observers of history? I believe that it is the
very nature of the service itself that does these things, the fact that the mercenary
essentially kills for money. It is relatively easy to understand someone killing and dying
for a country or for an idea, but when ideology is taken out ofthe picture and the
motivation turns solely to profit, it becomes a sordid affair in the minds of many. And
yet it was not so with the Greek citizen. To him, war an important part of life and of
citizenship, and, if his country did not need him, he was not averse to selling his skills to
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someone who did.

Although the observers of the period might have scoffed at them,the

mercenaries saw themselves as doing no evil by taking up the trade.
It is also important to remember that Greek mercenaries were not simply soldiers
and bringers of destruction, but ordinary men who choose, for their own reasons, an
unusual occupation. Some endured the wandering, fighting life ofa mercenary for a
short time as way of making money for their families or ofseeing the world while they
were young. Others chose the profession for life and never returned to their home cities.
Some assuredly died on foreign soil, with their dreams shattered and their share in victory
or defeat unclaimed. It is sadly unknown if these men ever stopped to consider the power
that they wielded: well led, they could make kings or break them, save empires

or

trample them under their feet. It was this power that kept their contemporaries from
being able to ignore them and that has kept their exploits alive through history.

Trundle 2004. p. 56.
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